An analysis of the legal liability of the Government of the United States of America and its chemical corporations for the effects of agent orange sprayed during the Vietnam War by Dang, Tran Nam Trung
AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND ITS CHEMICAL CORPORATIONS 
FOR THE EFFECTS OF AGENT ORANGE SPRAYED 
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
Candidate number: 8011
Supervisor: Asbjørn Eide
Deadline for submission: 5/15/2010
Number of words: 19,539
04/05/2010
________________________________________________________
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Faculty of Law
Content
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                                    ..................................................................................................1  
1.1  Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1
1.2  Research Question.....................................................................................................................5
1.3  Purpose and Structure of the thesis.........................................................................................6
1.4  Previous studies: .......................................................................................................................7
1.5 Methodology and Sources..........................................................................................................7
CHAPTER 2: THE USE OF HERBICIDES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT                                                                     ...................................................................9  
2.1  The use of herbicides during the Vietnam War......................................................................9
2.2 International law of armed conflict and the war in Vietnam................................................12
2.2.1 Does the Law of War Apply in The Vietnam War?.............................................................................13
2.2.2 What Are the Sources of Law Applicable to the War in Vietnam?.....................................................15
2.2.3 The Problem of Guerilla Warfare in the Vietnam War........................................................................19
2.3 The use of herbicides and violations of the law of armed conflict........................................21
2.3.1 Prohibition on Chemical Warfare.........................................................................................................22
2.3.2 Prohibition on the Use of Herbicides under the Hague Regulations....................................................25
2.3.3 The Use of Herbicides and the Principle of Distinction.......................................................................31
2.3.4 The Use of Herbicides was Disproportionate.......................................................................................32
2.4  The use of herbicides during the Vietnam War amounts to war crime and crime against 
humanity.........................................................................................................................................36
2.4.1 War Crime............................................................................................................................................36
2.4.2 Crime against humanity .......................................................................................................................38
CHAPTER 3: REDRESS                                                                                                                 ...............................................................................................................44  
3.1  Individual criminal liability....................................................................................................44
3.2  State responsibility and liability to pay compensation.........................................................49
3.2.1. Individual compensation.....................................................................................................................52
3.2.2 Corporate liability and civil suits for compensation.............................................................................54
CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW                                                                              ............................................................................55  
4.1  Corporate obligations under international law.....................................................................55
4.2  Imputability of a violation of international humanitarian law to a corporation................59
4.3  VAVA v. Dow et al ...................................................................................................................62
CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION                                                                                                       .....................................................................................................65  
BIBLIOGRAPHY
List of Abbreviations:
TCDD tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICC International Criminal Court
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
UN United Nations
NLF National Liberation Front
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
ILC International Law Commission
ACTA Alien Tort Claims Act
VAVA Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange/dioxin
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
ICRC International Committee of Red Cross
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
It has been now a long time nearly forty years since the Vietnam war ended in 
1975 but the devastation and suffering are now profoundly felt, in the land and in the 
minds and bodies of the affected population in Vietnam - my home country
In achieving the purpose of destroying food and military cover to those deemed to 
be “the enemy,” the U.S. defoliated the forests of Vietnam with the deadly chemicals 
Agent  Orange,  White,  Blue,  Pink,  Green  and  Purple.  Agent  Orange,  which  was 
contaminated with trace amounts of TCDD dioxin – the most toxic chemical known to 
science  –  disabled  and  sickened  soldiers,  civilians  and  several  generations  of  their 
offspring on two continents. 
During the period from 1962 to 1971, the United States military sprayed millions 
of chemical defoliants over a large area of land in Vietnam. The substance known as 
Agent  Orange accounted for a significant  portion of the total  amount  sprayed.  Agent 
Orange have caused many health  problem not only to Vietnamese people in  affected 
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areas but also those such as American, Australian, New Zealand, South Korean veterans 
exposed during the war and the afterward generations. According to Vietnamese Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  4.8  million  Vietnamese  people  were  exposed  to  Agent  Orange, 
resulting in 400,000 deaths and disabilities, and 500,000 children born with birth defects. 
The most affected zones are the mountainous area along Truong Son (Long Mountains) 
and the border between Vietnam and Cambodia1. The affected residents are living in sub-
standard conditions with many genetic diseases. After nearly 35 years, the use of Agent 
Orange still  has an effect on the citizens of Vietnam, poisoning their  food chain and 
creating concern about its effect on human beings. This chemical has been reported to 
cause serious skin diseases as well as a vast variety of cancers in the lungs, larynx, and 
prostate.  Children in the areas where Agent Orange was used have been affected and 
have  multiple  health  problems including  cleft  palate,  mental  disabilities,  hernias,  and 
extra fingers and toes.2
1  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 
(http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/tt_baochi/nr041126171753/ns050118101044)
2 Health Agent Orange blights Vietnam (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/227467.stm)
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The damage to the plant life of South Vietnam caused by the spraying of Agent Orange is 
still visible today. The most severe damage occurred in the mangrove forests (tropical 
trees and shrubs) of coastal areas where spraying left barren, badly eroded coastlines. The 
number of coastal birds declined dramatically, and with the disappearance of the web of 
water channels beneath the mangrove trees, fish were deprived of important breeding 
grounds. It is estimated that full recovery of the man-grove forests to their former state 
will take at least 100 years.3 
The contaminant TCDD is not easily or quickly broken down in soil, and there is concern 
that  herbicide  residues might  inhibit  the growth of crops and other plants.  These by-
products, which can be toxic, could then be passed to humans through the food chain. 
According  to  a  report  by  the  Hatfield  Group  (a  Canada-based  company  conducting 
research the long-term environmental effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam)  in the areas 
that were sprayed by Agent Orange during the war, the measured levels of dioxin do not 
pose a threat to health. However, many of the former US military bases in Vietnam where 
3 Agent Orange - Ecological effects  (http://www.scienceclarified.com/A-Al/Agent-Orange.html)
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the herbicides were stored and loaded onto airplanes still have high level of dioxins in the 
soil. These 'Dioxin Hotspots' still pose a health threat to the surrounding communities4.
Though the legacy of Agent Orange remains a contentious issue among  the Vietnam War 
veterans and the full scientific understanding of Agent Orange on human health has not 
been reached,  it  is  now quite  clear  that  there is  a  causal  relationship  between Agent 
Orange and some diseases.  So what would be remedies for those who suffered from 
Agent Orange? 
Since  the  1980s,  in  the  United  States  several  lawsuits  have  been  filed  against  the 
companies which produced Agent Orange, among them Dow Chemical,  Monsanto, and 
Diamond Shamrock. U.S. veterans obtained a $180 million settlement in 19845.  Also in 
1984, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand veteran plaintiffs received compensation 
under out-of court settlement which was reached on the condition that the defendant did 
not have to admit any liability. Notably in South Korea, on January 26, 2006,  The Seoul 
High Court issued a combined ruling on two cases (2002Na32662, 2002Na32686) that 
Dow Chemical Company and Monsanto Company, the US manufacturers of the defoliant 
known  as  Agent  Orange,  pay  63  billion  won  (about  US$62  million)  in  medical 
compensation to Korean veterans of Vietnam War and their families6. This ruling marks 
the first  time that a Korean court  has awarded reparations  to the Korean veterans  by 
recognizing a casual relationship between the defoliant and some of the illnesses of the 
plaintiffs which Agent Orange has been known to cause. 
However, so far no Vietnamese victims have received compensation and the lawsuit filed 
by the Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange against the chemical companies producing 
was rejected by all U.S. courts (the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York , the Court of Appeals and the US Supreme Court). Does this mean that the 
Vietnamese  victims  of  Agent  Orange  can  not  enjoy  the  justice  they  deserve?  If  the 
answer is yes, they can. The next question is on what legal grounds and what is the legal 
liability for the US government and its chemical companies involved in the use of Agent 
Orange during the war? This thesis is trying to address that question.
4 Oslo Paper  2006 - the Agent Orange dioxin issue in Vietnam : a manageable problem, page 2
5  Unites States Department of Veteran Affairs 
(http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/Benefits/Herbicide/AOno2.htm)
6 Information available at www.korealaw.com/node/35
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1.2  Research Question
Until  recently,  the US government  has  not  addressed the effects  of  Agent  Orange in 
Vietnam. Since 2002, a number of joint scientific projects between Vietnam and the US 
have  been  initiated  to  study  the  impact  of  Agent  Orange  on  human  health  and 
environment. In 2005, both sides agreed to establish the Joint Advisory Committee on 
Agent Orange made up of representatives of Vietnamese and US government agencies to 
explore  areas  of  scientific  cooperation,  technical  assistance  and  environmental 
remediation of dioxin.  Remarkably, following the meeting between President Bush and 
President Nguyen Minh Triet of Vietnam,  the two governments issued a joint statement 
which  includes  a  sentence  “The  US  and  Vietnam agreed  that  further  joint  effort  to 
address  the  environmental  contamination  near  former  dioxin  storage  facilities  would 
make valuable contribution to  the continued development of bilateral relationships”  7. 
Some Members of Congress were also of the view that the US has a “moral obligations” 
toward  Vietnamese  people   to  help  address  the  health  and  environmental  problem 
generated  by  Agent  Orange  during  the  Vietnam  War.  In  April  2008,  Senator  John 
McCain said “I believe it remains irritant , and perhaps more than that, for some of the 
people  of  Vietnam.  I  think  we  need  to  continue  to  address  the  issue  both  in  the 
compensation  for  the  victims  as  well  as  cleanup  of   areas  which  are  clearly 
contaminated.”8
However, to date, the largest group of Agent Orange victims – the Vietnamese victims – 
has not received any compensation or assistance under any form, except small amounts of 
Government  welfare  payments  and  assistance  from charity  organizations.  One  major 
effort  by  a  group  of  Vietnamese  victims  to  bring  a  law  suit  against  the  chemical 
companies has so far not yielded any positive results. The decision to dismiss the case by 
a District Court was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in New York, but 
the ruling is no change. The blight of the war for these victims hence continues.
Legal questions:
7 ”Joint Statement  Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America” on  17 
November 2006
8 “Agent Orange Victims  Needs More Support : John McCain”, Thanh Nien News, 8 April 2008
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The controversy over the use of herbicides, and Agent Orange in particular, has raged 
over the years since their use in Vietnam. The political and scientific debate has to date 
mostly surrounded the effects of Agent Orange on American veterans.9 But little attention 
is  paid  to  the  damaging  effects  on  Vietnam  and  its  people.  Particularly,  while  the 
Vietnam War itself has generated a huge amount of literature on its military, political and 
legal aspects, surprisingly little has been written on the legality of the military use of 
herbicides  in Vietnam.  In the four comprehensive  volumes of  The Vietnam War and 
International  Law,10 for  example,  the  use  of  herbicides,  and Agent  Orange,  are  only 
sporadically mentioned and dealt with.
The paper is thus going fill this gap by examining the following issues:
• Whether  and  how  the  use  of  herbicides  during  the  Vietnam  War  violated 
international law of armed conflict. It will be argued that herbicide use constituted a 
violation of the principles and rules of international conventional and customary law 
regulating the conduct of warfare concerning means and methods of warfare and the 
protection of victims of war.
• If  so,  what  would  be  the  possible  legal  consequences  or  remedies  for  such 
violation?
• Finally,  whether there is any legal  basis for holding a corporation liable  for a 
violation of international law as far as the accused US chemical corporations are 
concerned?
1.3  Purpose and Structure of the thesis
Since the Agent Orange is a very contentious issue in the history of relationship 
between the US and Vietnam, any practical solution should take into account both legal 
and  political  aspects  of  the  problem.  That  is  not  the  aim  of  this  paper;  rather  it  is  
9 Michael G. Palmer, ‘The Case of Agent Orange’ (2007) 29 Contemporary Southeast Asia 172, 174. See 
also, e.g., Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee to Review the Health Effects on Vietnam Veterans of 
Exposure to Herbicides, Veterans and Agent Orange (1994-2006) (a series of twelve reports); Fred A. 
Wilcox, Waiting for an Army to Die: The Tragedy of Agent Orange (1983); A.L. Young and G.M. Reggiani 
(eds), Agent Orange and Its Associated Dioxin: Assessment of A Controversy (1988).
10 Richard A. Falk (ed), The Vietnam War and International Law (1968-1976), Volumes 1-4.
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exploring  all possible legal solutions by analyzing relevant aspects of international law 
in this regard. 
This paper shall be divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction that 
briefly describe the background situation and the rationale for choosing this topic. The 
methodology and sources of law are also included this chapter. Chapter 2 examines the 
question of  whether and how the use of herbicides during the Vietnam War violated 
international  law of armed conflict.  It  will  be argued that  herbicide use constituted  a 
violation  of  the principles  and rules  of  international  conventional  and customary law 
regulating  the conduct  of warfare concerning means and methods of warfare and the 
protection of victims of war; and such violation amount to war crime and crime against 
humanity.  Chapter 3  will address the issue of redress for violation with focus on state’s  
responsibility.  Chapter  4  will  deal  with  corporate  civil  liability  for  the  violation  of 
international law. And finally, Chapter 5 is conclusion.
1.4  Previous studies: 
A number  of  books,  journals,  and articles  have  been published on the  use  of 
Agent Orange and its effects on human health and environment, the public international 
law, humanitarian laws in conflicts, the responsibility and liability of states… And with 
those previous studies and some other sources of information,  I will use them as far as  
possible  in  my  thesis  to  describe  and  analyze  the  legal  grounds  for  holding  US 
government  and  its  chemical  companies  involved  accountable  for  the  use  of  Agent 
Orange during the Vietnam War.
1.5 Methodology and Sources
In my research thesis, I am going to describe situation background through a 
descriptive method and then to take the traditional legal method to analyze the problem. 
The examination of international law will be conducted on the basis of the texts of law 
and in light of the Statue of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Article 38 (1) and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Then the examination of legal liability 
will be taken by looking at the development and practice of international law in this 
regard. Accordingly, the sources of law relied on in this thesis are international 
customary law as part of international humanitarian law, international treaties 
7
conventions, case law, and judicial decisions.  In addition, some other source of 
information and critical points of view from academic work could also be utilized.
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Chapter 2: The Use of Herbicides during the Vietnam War and 
International Law of Armed Conflict
2.1  The use of herbicides during the Vietnam War
The evidence of using poisons to kill plants can be found back to as early as year 
300 B.C., when the Romans salted the croplands of Carthage to make the soil barren.11 
IThe use of poison in the form of more sophisticated chemicals continued in modern 
times and gained strength during and after the Second World War. The British seem to 
have been the first  to employ herbicides at a limited tactical level in Malaysia during the 
late 1940s and 1950s.12 The US army became interested in herbicides shortly after entry 
into World War II but it was not until its involvement in Vietnam that herbicides were 
employed on a significant scale in combat.13 The US used herbicides either to defoliate 
vegetation, thus removing natural cover that might conceal the enemy, or destroy food 
crops.14 Hence  by  the  time  of  the  increased  involvement  of  the  U.S.  in  Vietnam, 
herbicides had been developed and included in the U.S.’s chemical arsenal.    
The decision  to  start  the spraying of  herbicides  in Vietnam,  which eventually 
became the first full-scale military use of herbicides, was foreshadowed by a series of 
events that began in April 1961, when Walt W. Rostow, President J.F.Kennedy’s foreign 
affairs  advisor,  proposed  holding  a  meeting  to  consider  ‘gearing  up’  the  Vietnam 
operation.15 Subsequent meetings resulted in proposals to use ‘modern technological area-
denial techniques to control the roads and trails along Vietnam’s border’.16 By July of the 
same year, specific proposals had been made, including the use of defoliants, and the first 
11 Carol Van Strum, A Bitter Fog: Herbicides and Human Rights (1980), 10.
12 Almqvist and Wiksell, The Problem of Chemicaland Biological  Warfare volume I (1971) - Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 162.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid, 163.
15 William A. Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia  
1961-1971 (1982), 9.
16 Ibid, 11.
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batch  of  herbicides  had  arrived  in  Saigon  for  test  missions,  which  initially  were 
conducted by the South Vietnamese Air Force.17 
In December 1961, President Kenedy authorized the Department of Defense to 
commence operational trials of herbicides in certain areas of South Vietnam. With the 
acceptance of the South Vietnamese Government, a test programme known as Operation 
Ranch Hand began its missions, and grew into the largest defoliation operation, lasting 
for a decade until 1971.18 The Operation was responsible for the spraying of about 95% 
of all herbicides dispersed during the war, with the rest being sprayed by helicopters and 
ground equipment.19 
Operation  Ranch  Hand served  two purposes:  (i)  to  defoliate  jungle  terrain  to 
deprive enemy forces of cover, thus improving visibility and preventing ambush, and (ii) 
to destroy crops to deny the enemy of food sources. In addition, herbicides were used to 
clear  vegetation surrounding bases and other  military installations.20 To achieve these 
objectives, nearly 20,000 sorties of Ranch Hand fixed wing aircrafts, mainly C-123, were 
run from 1961-1971, averaging almost 11 sorties per day. The operation of Ranch Hand 
saw a steady increase coinciding with the rise in American military build-up and the 
intensity of the war, peaking in 1968-69, then slowly declined.21 According to Stellman 
et al., some 2.6 million hectares of land were sprayed with herbicides, with most areas 
being sprayed more than once and nearly 300,000 hectares treated ten times or more.22 
Their estimates also show that ‘at least 2.1 million but perhaps as many as 4.8 million 
people’ would have been sprayed on with herbicides.23 The total amount of herbicides 
used in Vietnam varies according to different sources, ranging between 67 million and 73 
17 Ibid., 167.
18 Almqvist and Wiksell, supra note 2, 164.
19 Jeanne Meager Stellman, Steven D. Stellman, Richard Christian, Tracy Weber and Carrie Tomasallo, 
‘The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam’ (2003) 422 Nature 
681, 681-2.
20 E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., Report to the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs on the Association  
Between Adverse Health Effects and Exposure to Agent Orange (1990), 4.
21 Stellman et al., supra note 18, Figure 5.
22 Ibid, table 2.
23 Ibid, 685.
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million litres,24 or even up to 80 million litres, according to most recent figures.25 The 
major herbicides employed included Agent Purple, Agent Orange, Agent Blue and Agent 
White, code-named according to the colour strips on the barrels containing them. Agent 
Orange, the most controversial herbicide of all, accounted for about 60% of all herbicides 
used during the war. Up to 85% of all Agent Orange was used for forest defoliation, with 
the  rest  being  used  for  crop  destruction  and  vegetation  clearance  around  base 
perimeters.26 
There  was  some  concern  within  the  US  Government  at  that  time  regarding 
possible damage to human health and ecology system. In August 1970, a number of US 
senators  opposed  to  the  herbicide  operations  in  Vietnam  by  proposing  a  pair  of 
amendments to the 1971 military appropriations bill, basing their case on the long term 
dangers  of  herbicides  and  on  the  inconclusiveness  of  the  evidence  about  its  overall 
military  benefits. US Ambassador to South Vietnam and the Commander of US forces in 
Vietnam, Creighton Abrams, had cabled Washington recommending that the chemical 
crop-destruction should be stopped immediately.
Agent Orange is a 50:50 mixture of two n-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T.27 
This  chemical  mixture  kills  plants  by disrupting  their  basis  growth processes,  and is 
particularly effective in killing a range of broadleaf plants that are often found in the 
jungles of Vietnam.28 The problem with Agent Orange, also the reason for the whole 
controversy over its use, is that it  is always contaminated with a certain amount of a 
dioxin known as TCDD, which has been described as ‘perhaps the most toxic molecule 
ever  synthesized  by  man’.29 This  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  unlike  civilian 
applications the Agent Orange used in Vietnam are sprayed in undiluted form, which 
means it is sprayed in concentrations 6 to 25 times higher than the normal suggested 
rate.30 The research done by Stellman  et al. reveals that as much as 366 kilograms of 
24 A.L. Young and G.M. Reggiani, Agent Orange and Its Associated Dioxin: Assessment of A Controversy  
(1988), 12-13.
25 Stellman et al., supra note 18, 681.
26 Young, supra 14, 14.
27 Ibid, 10.
28 Carol Van Strum, A Bitter Fog: Herbicides and Human Rights (1980), 12-3.
29 Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (1986), 18.
30 Zumwalt, supra note 19, 4.
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TCDD were dispersed with the herbicides sprayed in Vietnam.31 This figure is astounding 
given that a daily inhalation of 0.18 picograms of TCDD by a 70 kg man would have the 
potential of causing cancerous diseases.32 TCDD is believed to have ‘significant potential 
to cause birth defects’ and to cause certain cancerous diseases such as non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma and soft-tissue sarcomas.33 And since TCDD is very persistent in human tissue 
and the environment, even decades after the use of Agent Orange, many Vietnamese still 
have  elevated  blood  levels  of  dioxin.34 Moreover,  apart  from the  millions  of  people 
believed to be directly exposed to herbicides, there are hundreds of thousands of second 
and third generations of victims of herbicides.
2.2 International law of armed conflict and the war in Vietnam
There has been a heated debate concerning the legality of Vietnam War which is 
better  known  to  most  Vietnamese  as  the  ‘anti-American  resistance  war  for  national 
liberation’. Both sides of the debate have been making strong cases for the view they 
support.35 In examining the legality of the use of herbicides during the war, it may be 
tempting to dig into this debate and to argue that the American war effort in Vietnam was 
illegal,  and  that  therefore  all  acts  conducted  by  the  American  military,  including 
herbicide use, must be deemed illegal. However, such an approach would not be useful. 
In  fact,  the  International  Military  Tribunal  at  Nuremberg  rejected  some  prosecutors’ 
argument that every act by the German military was of criminal nature because the war 
itself  was an act  of aggression.  The Tribunal  stated that  while  the wars  waged were 
criminal,  ‘it  does not  follow that  every act  by the German occupation  forces  against 
31 Stellman et al., supra note 18, 684.
32 Arthur W. Galston, ‘Herbicides: A Mixed Blessing’ (1979) 29 BioScience 85, 88. 
(Note: 1 picogram = 10-12 x 1 gram)
33 Zumwalt, supra note 19, 7-9. For a full list of diseases recognized as caused by Agent Orange/dioxin, see 
Updated List of Diseases Currently Recognized by Veterans Affairs as related to Herbicides Exposure (Jan 
2003), available at http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/files/Diseases_Related_to_Herbicide_Exposure.pdf . See 
also Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee to Review the Health Effects on Vietnam Veterans of 
Exposure to Herbicides, Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2006. 
34 Arnold Schecter et al., ‘Agent Orange and the Vietnamese: The Persistence of Elevated Dioxin Levels in 
Human Tissues’ (1995) 85 American Journal of Public Health 516, 516, 520.
35 See, eg, The Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, 
Vietnam and International Law: An Analysis of the Legality of the U.S. Military Involvement (1967) and 
The Legality of United States Participation in Defense of Vietnam, Memorandum of Law, Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, March 4, 1966, reprinted in Richard A. Falk, Vol. 1 (1968) 583.
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person or property is a crime’.36 Therefore, it is necessary and indeed more desirable to 
‘move out of metaphysics  and into the narrow question of whether some  methods of 
conducting war are illegal’.37
In answering this  question,  it  is  first  of all  essential  to  identify the normative 
framework of the inquiry. In other words, the law applicable to the conduct of the war 
needs to be worked out. This part will make this determination. It will first examine how 
the Vietnam War should be characterized as this is the first necessary step for an inquiry 
into the applicable law. The part will then identify the different sources of law applied 
during the war and briefly discuss the interactions among these sources.
2.2.1 Does the Law of War Apply in The Vietnam War?
Vietnam had been colonized by the French since the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The end of the Second World War with Japan having been defeated led to the 
Declaration of Independence and the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, led by 
Ho Chi Minh. The French never recognized this new government when they returned at 
the end of World War II, giving rise to the decade-long war that only ended after the Dien 
Bien Phu battle and the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954.38 
The Accords are outcomes of the Geneva Conference convened by Britain, the 
Soviet Union, the United States, France and China, with the participation of the Laos, 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the State of Vietnam.39 The 
Accords  relating  to Vietnam40 established a  ‘provisional  demarcation  line’  at  the 17th 
36 See Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, The International Law of War: Transnational  
Coercion and World Public Order (1994) 531-3.
37 Anthony A. D'Amato, Harvey L. Gould and Larry D. Woods, ‘War Crimes and Vietnam: The 
"Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service Resister’ (1969) 57 California Law Review 1055, 1057.
38 For a full account of this period in the history of the war in Indochina, see generally Hammer, ‘Genesis of 
the First Indochinese War: 1946-1950’ in Marvin E. Gettleman (ed) Vietnam: History, Documents and 
Opinions on a World Crisis (1965) 63; Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, End of A War: Indochina 
1954 (English translation from French by Alexander Lieven and Adam Roberts) (1969)
39 The State of Vietnam was created under French protection to compete with the DRV, but could never 
become an effective alternative to the DRV Government.
40 The Accords relating to Vietnam consist of the Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief of the  
French Union Forces in Indochina and the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Army of Vietnam on the  
Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam signed at Geneva, July 20, 1954, and the Final Declaration of the  
Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indochina, Geneva, July 21, 1954. The full texts 
of these two documents are reprinted in Falk (ed), supra note 34, Vol.1, 543-559.
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parallel for the regrouping of the armies of the two sides.41 The Conference agreed that 
this  line was ‘provisional  and should not  in any way be interpreted  as constituting a 
political or territorial boundary’.42 The Final Declaration also provided that the political 
problems  in  Vietnam  shall  be  settled  ‘on  the  basis  of  respect  for  the  principles  of 
independence, unity and territorial integrity’ (para. 7). Hence the view of the DRV and its 
supporters that Vietnam had been and remained one state, and that American intervention 
in  Vietnam  is  therefore  an  act  of  aggression  and  thus  illegal.43 The  U.S.  and  its 
supporters, on the contrary, argue that the demarcation line fixed by the Geneva Accords 
created  two  independent  states,  North  Vietnam  and  South  Vietnam,  and  that  the 
‘infiltration of thousands of armed men’ by North Vietnam into the South constituted an 
‘armed attack’, an ‘external aggression’.44 This view, combined with the contention that 
the U.S. exercised the right to collective self-defense in protection of South Vietnam, it is 
argued, justified the U.S. actions in Vietnam.45 But no matter who is right or wrong the 
war  in  Vietnam  since  U.S.  intervention  arguably  is  a  conflict  of  an  international 
character.  This  characterization  of  the  conflict  thus  triggers  the  application  of  the 
international laws of war. The absence of a formal declaration of war, which traditionally 
would be an obstacle,  does  not  prevent  such application  of  law since ‘[t]he rules  of 
international law concerning the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict 
apply regardless of any declaration of war.46 In addition, in the view of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross
[t]he hostilities raging at the present time in Viet-Nam – both North and South of 
the 17th parallel – have assumed such proportions recently that there can be no 
41 Article 1, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam.
42 Paragraph 6, Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.
43 See Quincy Wright, ‘Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation’ (1966) 60 American Journal of  
International Law 750, 750-9 for a detailed discussion of this point. See also John H. Messing, ‘American 
Action in Vietnam: Justifiable in International Law?’ (1967) 19 Stanford Law Review 1307 for a point-by-
point critical review of the Department of State Legal Adviser’s Memorandum of Law.
44 The Legality of United States Participation in Defense of Vietnam, Memorandum of Law, Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, March 4, 1966, reprinted in Richard A. Falk (ed), supra note 34, Vol. 1 
(1968) 583, section I.A.
45 Ibid, section I.B-E.
46 The Legality of United States Participation in Defense of Vietnam, supra note 43, section I.G.
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doubt they constitute an armed conflict to which the regulations of humanitarian 
law as a whole should be applied.47
Hence, the war in Vietnam is an international conflict to which the rules of international 
law of armed conflicts should apply.
2.2.2 What Are the Sources of Law Applicable to the War in Vietnam?
In addition to the rules of international law which  govern resort to force (jus ad 
bellum), there is another body of international law which seeks to govern the conduct of 
hostilities when the decision to resort to force has been taken and fighting has started (jus 
in bello). The terms ‘law of war’ or ‘law of armed conflict’ or ‘international humanitarian 
law’, despite having different connotations,48 have been and will be used interchangeably 
to refer to the set of principles covering the treatment of prisoner, civilians in occupied 
territory, sick and wounded personnel, prohibited methods of warfare and human rights in 
situations of conflict.49 
The efforts to regulate the conduct of warfare date as far back as the time of Sun 
Tzu, even though nothing in his writings indicates that the limitations on the conduct of 
hostilities he had prescribed formed legal or moral obligations for parties to an armed 
conflict.50 Over the centuries,  however,  these kinds of limitations  and regulations  has 
developed into a body of law that imposes on belligerents limits on how they conduct 
hostilities.  Until  the  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907,  when  the  international 
community first agreed to the codification of international laws of war, these rules have 
served to regulate the conduct of warfare. The emergence of an increasingly large amount 
of international  treaties  had not? put an end to customs.  They have,  on the contrary, 
47 Letter of the International Committee of the Red Cross addressed to the Governments of the Democratic  
Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the United States and the National Liberation Front of  
South Vietnam on 11 June 1965, cited in Lawrence C. Petrowski, ‘Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam 
War’ (1968) in Falk, supra note 7, Vol. 2 (1969), 439.
48 See, eg, Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (1975), 11-26 and Adam 
Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Law of War (3rd ed, 2000), 1-2 for a brief discussion of 
these terms.
49 Malcom N. Shaw, International law ( Sixth edition - 2008), 1167.
50 T.L.H. McCormack, ‘From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The Evolution of an International Criminal 
Law Regime’ in T.L.H. McCormack and G.J.Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes: National and 
International Approaches (1997) 31, 33. For an account of the historical roots and developments of the law 
of war, see also Geoffrey Best, ‘The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective’ in Astrid 
J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja (eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead – Essays  
in Honour of Frits Kalshoven (1991), 3.
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existed side by side, complementing each other in the common effort to reduce to the 
extent possible the ravages of war and the sufferings that ensue. 
2.2.2.1  Customary Law of War
Historically,  the  law  of  war  was  made  up  solely  of  customs.  Customary 
international law can be described as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.51 
This body of law is unwritten and, unlike treaties, is binding upon all states, with the 
exception of the ‘persistent objector’ principle. As suggested by Art.38 (1)(b) of the ICJ 
Statute,  quoted  above,  state  practice  and  opinio  juris are  the  two  components  of 
customary law. As the International Court of Justice stated in the Continental Shelf case: 
“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked 
for primarily in the actual practice and  opinio juris  of States.”52According to Michael 
Akehurst,  state practice can include acts and claims,  statements  in abstracto,  national 
laws and judgments as well as omissions or abstention from a certain act.53 Opinio juris, 
on  the  other  hand,  can  be  ascertained,  like  what  the  ICJ  did  in  the  Military  and 
Paramilitary Activities case, by looking at inter alia statements by states and resolutions 
of the United Nations.54
Having  its  roots  in  different  civilizations,  customary  law  of  war  developed 
primarily in the European and Atlantic worlds. However, as Geoffrey Best indicated, this 
has not hindered its expansion to other regions and other racial,  religious and national 
groups. He also points out that by the eighteenth century, the customs of war were well 
embedded in the tradition of the militaries and were respected by the officers and soldiers 
because of their religious and moral beliefs, despite the absence of signed treaties among 
states.55 The fundamental general principles of customary law of war from which all other 
principles  and  rules  derive  are  the  principle  of  military  necessity,  the  principle  of 
51 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
52 International Court of Justice, Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment,
     3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 29–30, § 27.
53 Michael Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’ (1976) 47 British Yearbook of  
International Law 1.
54 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America), [1986] ICJ Reports 14, paras.187-193 (Merits).
55 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (1994), 39-40.
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humanity and the ‘somewhat romantic’ but now outdated principle of chivalry.56 These 
principles require belligerents to strike a balance between the need to use force to achieve 
legitimate military goals and the need to alleviate human suffering caused by that use of 
force. This balancing act compels parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of distinction 
and  proportionality,  both  of  which,  widely  recognized  as  customary  law,  will  be 
examined in more detail in the next part.
2.2.2.2 Conventional Law of War
In addition to customary law, treaties are an important  source of international  law in 
general  and  the  law  of  war  in  particular.  A  treaty  is  ‘an  international  agreement 
concluded  between  States’,  and  as  such  must  be  observed  by the  parties  to  it.  It  is 
important to point out, however, that unlike customary law, which is binding on all states, 
treaties do not ‘create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’.57 
Hence, treaties apply only to the States that have ratified them. This means that different 
treaties of international humanitarian law apply in different armed conflicts depending on 
which treaties the States involved have ratified
As indicated earlier, the first major effort to codify international law of war was 
made  at  the  1899  Hague  Conference  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  what  some 
consider  as  the  fundamentals  of  the  modern  laws  of  war  –  the  Hague  Regulations 
Respecting  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  Land.58 The  1907  Hague  Conference 
reviewed the 1899 regulations and adopted other conventions regulating primarily the 
means and methods of warfare.59 The ‘law of the Hague’, as this set of rules has become 
known  as,  prohibits,  for  instance,  the  use  of  expanding,  or  ‘dum-dum’  bullets,  the 
discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons and the use of poison or poisoned 
weapons. In addition, one of the important contributions of the Hague Conventions to the 
law of war is the inclusion of the Martens clause, named after the Russian jurist and 
delegate at the 1899 Hague Conference. The clause appears in the preamble of Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and reads 
56 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 35, 522.
57 See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 2(1)(a), 26 and 34-6.
58 See Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959), 5. 
59 For a full collection of the Hague Conventions see International Committee of the Red Cross, 
International Law Concerning the Conduct of Hostilities: Collection of Hague Conventions and Some  
Other Treaties (1989).
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Until  a  more  complete  code  of  the  laws  of  war  has  been  issued,  the  High 
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not  included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the populations and the belligerents remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and the requirements of the public conscience.
This clause has since appeared, albeit in varying forms, in other treaties on the subject, 
reflecting  the  reality  that  states  are  unable  to  agree  on  provisions  covering  all 
circumstances and the view that matters should not ‘be left to the arbitrary judgment of 
the military commanders’.60 As the U.S. Military Tribunal in the  Krupp case indicated, 
the Martens clause provided the ‘legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific 
provisions … do not cover specific circumstances’.61 Additionally, as the codification of 
law always omit some matters, the Martens clause helps avoid a situation in which the 
customary rule is undermined by it not being included in the codified law.62
Horrified by the devastating effects of World War II, states have also agreed on a 
set of rules to provide better protection to the victims of war. The Diplomatic Conference 
held  in  Geneva  in  1949  thus  adopted  four  Conventions  aimed  at  ameliorating  the 
condition of the wounded and sick soldiers in war on land (Convention I) and in war at 
sea (Convention II), regulating the treatment of prisoners of war (Convention III) and the 
protection  of  the  civilian  population  in  time  of  war  (Convention  IV).  This  ‘law  of 
Geneva’ segment of the law of war, albeit essential to the protection of victims of war, is  
not  particularly relevant  to the subject  of this  paper.  The focus hence will  be on the 
Hague Regulations.
2.2.2.3. The Relationship between Customary Law and Treaties
The  discussion  of  the  Martens  clause  above  signaled  a  relationship  between 
conventional and customary law. As Anton et al. contend, treaties may ‘crystallize’ into 
customary rules, making them binding on both parties and non-parties of the treaty.63 For 
60 Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making (1984), 6.
61 See Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’ 
(2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 78, 80.
62 Ibid.
63 Donald Anton, Penelope Mathew and Wayne Morgan, International Law: Cases and Materials (2005), 
212. 
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example, according to the Nuremberg trials, the Hague Conventions have by 1939 had 
been recognized by all civilized nations, hence attained a customary status.64 And, as will 
be argued below, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol has ‘crystallized’ into customary law. 
Importantly, the emergence of a treaty norm does not in any way nullify the existence of 
a customary rule. As the ICJ stated in the Military and Paramilitary case
…  even  if  two  norms  belonging  to  two  sources  of  international  law  appear 
identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules 
both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these 
norms retain a separate existence.65
In  other  words,  treaty  rules  and  the  rules  of  customary  law  exist  side  by  side  and 
complement each other. Where treaty rules cannot be found, the rules of customary law 
are the guidelines for the examination of the legality of the conduct of hostilities.
2.2.3 The Problem of Guerilla Warfare in the Vietnam War
While the characterization of a conflict as international usually is sufficient for 
triggering the application of the law of war in its entirety as outlined above, the war in 
Vietnam raises a significant problem in its application. Unlike traditional conventional 
warfare  where  the  combat  zones  and  the  combatants  can  be  clearly  identified,  a 
proportion of  the war in  Vietnam was conducted  by guerillas.  They mingle  with the 
people, like ‘fish in the sea’, to borrow Mao Zedong’s words, and use stealth as their 
weapon. Because they are not members of the armed forces of the state, the law of war 
traditionally did not apply to them. Consequently, they could be shot as war criminals.66 
Efforts to regulate the conduct of guerillas have primarily focused on the question of 
whether guerillas should be granted the status of prisoner of war if and when they are 
captured, and whether the law of war would apply to them, both in terms of rights and of 
obligations.  Thus the Hague Regulations of 1907 provides that the law of war would 
apply to members of militias and volunteer corps if they are ‘commanded by a person 
responsible  for  his  subordinates’,  ‘[have]  a  fixed  distinctive  sign  recognizable  at  a 
distance’,  ‘[carry]  arms openly’  and [conduct]  their operations in accordance with the 
64 See Roberts and Guelff, supra note 47, 178.
65 Military and Paramilitary Case, para.178.
66 Petrowski, supra note 46, 479.
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laws and customs of war’. Similarly,  Geneva Convention III secures the treatment  as 
prisoners of war for members of militias and organized resistance movements if they 
meet the above criteria.67 But these are very harsh conditions the compliance with which 
would be suicidal given the reliance of guerillas on hit-and-run attacks and clandestine 
operations.68
Failure to abide by these rules by the irregular forces in Vietnam has been used to 
argue that the U.S. military did not have the obligation to comply with the law of war in 
its  ‘counter-insurgency’  efforts.  As an American  official  stated:  ‘… It’s  a  rough and 
brutal  war. The Viet Cong has never heard of the Marquis of Queensbury or Geneva 
Conventions,  and  we  can’t  afford  to  lose  just  because  we  have  heard  of  them’.69 
However, the law of treaties, while allowing parties to a multilateral treaty to suspend the 
operation of the treaty if another party has committed a material breach, does not allow 
such derogations in regards of ‘provisions relating to the protection of the human person 
contained  in  treaties  of  humanitarian  character’.70 Therefore,  even  in  face  of  alleged 
violations by the Vietnamese guerillas of the law of war, the U.S. is barred from refusing 
to apply such law, particularly their provisions of ‘humanitarian character’. As Richard 
Falk sharply argues, ‘the violations by the other side do not vindicate our own, unless 
committed in specific reprisal’,  and as a leader of ‘Western civilization’ and the most 
‘advanced’  nation  in  the  world,  the  U.S.  should  be  compelled  to  respect  the  highest 
standards of the laws and customs of war.71
Even if one does not accept this argument, there are other reasons why the U.S. 
has to comply with the law of armed conflicts in its conduct of the war in Vietnam, and in 
its use of herbicides in particular. It is an undisputed fact that there are different groups of 
combatants in Vietnam, including the forces of the National Liberation Front (NLF) – 
often referred to as Viet Cong, and regular forces belonging to the DRV’s People’s Army 
of  Vietnam.  Henri  Meyrowitz  identified  four  separate  confrontations  in  the  conflict: 
Saigon Government v. NLF, U.S v. NLF, Saigon Government v. DRV and U.S. v. DRV. 
67 See Article 1, Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907 and Article 4, 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949.
68 See Petrowski, supra note 46, 480.
69 Quoted in Petrowski, supra note 46, 487.
70 See Pictet, supra note 47, 21-2.
71 See Petrowski, supra note 46, 485.
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The U.S – DRV conflict was characterized by American bombings of targets in North 
Vietnam and also clashes in the South.72 In 1967, the U.S. State Department recognized 
that both the U.S. and the DRV regular military units to the conflict and these units have 
engaged in major clashes during the 1965-67 period. It also alleged that DRV’s regular 
forces constituted at least 45% of the enemy Main Force.73 Therefore, even if it can be 
argued that the guerilla war in Vietnam waives the U.S.’s obligations under the law of 
armed conflicts towards the NLF’s forces, America still owe duties under the law of war 
towards the regular forces of the DRV. Moreover, since the NLF also has a large Main 
Force that is engaged in the hostilities apart from guerilla forces,74 and these forces are 
not alleged of failing the conditions set out in the Hague Regulations quoted above,75 
nothing  can  justify  derogation  from  the  U.S.’s  obligations  under  conventional  and 
customary law of war. This is particularly relevant to the examination of the use of Agent 
Orange during the war since it is probably impossible to prove that Agent Orange was 
only sprayed where NLF guerilla forces, which are allegedly not legal combatants, were 
present.
In conclusion of this this part, no matter how one sees the conflict in Vietnam, it 
is a conflict of an international character. Such characterization triggers the application of 
the international law of armed conflict, which is composed of both treaties and customary 
rules. The fact that the conflict is, to a certain extent, a guerilla war does not prevent the 
application of law, and in particular does not waive the obligations of the United States 
under the law of war.
2.3 The use of herbicides and violations of the law of armed conflict
The legal framework set out in the preceding part will now be used to examine the 
legality of the use of herbicides during the war in Vietnam. The argument will be four-
fold. The use of herbicides violated (i) the rules prohibiting chemical warfare, (ii) the 
72 Henri Meyrowitz, ‘The Law of War in the Vietnamese Conflict’ in Falk (ed),  525-533.
73 Working Paper of U.S. State Department on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam, 
reprinted in Falk, Vol. 2, 1198, 1200.
74 According to the U.S. State Department, Viet Cong main force had a strength of 64,000 men in 1967, and 
this figure represented only a fraction of the total strength. See State Department Working Paper, supra 
note 71, 1204. 
75 Meyrowitz, supra note 71, 541.
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prohibition on poison and weapons causing unnecessary suffering, (iii) the principle of 
distinction, and (iv) the principle of proportionality. 
2.3.1 Prohibition on Chemical Warfare
In the wake of World War I during which some 1.3 million casualties were caused 
by the use of toxic chemicals, states members of the League of Nations saw the need to 
develop a chemical disarmament treaty. Efforts to that end resulted in the adoption of the 
Protocol  for  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use in  War  of  Asphyxiating,  Poisonous or  Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (hereinafter referred to as the Geneva 
Protocol).76 Coming out  of an essentially  arms  control  effort,  the Geneva Protocol  is 
considered as part of international humanitarian law primarily because the chief purpose 
of the Geneva Protocol – to prohibit the use of toxic chemicals – coincides with the aims 
of international humanitarian law, in particular the law of the Hague.77 In the Geneva 
Protocol,78 the parties recognized the cruelty of the use of toxic chemicals as a method of 
warfare and that ‘the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the 
majority  of  Powers  of  the  world  are  Parties’.  The Protocol  declared  ‘[t]hat  the  High 
Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, 
accept this prohibition’ against use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. But the 
scope of the Protocol is a subject of dispute among states. It is asserted, for example, that 
the Protocol does not proscribe the use of anti-plant chemicals because these chemicals 
are  used  domestically  in  peacetime  and  because  the  drafters  were  not  aware  of  the 
existence of anti-plant chemicals. This view, however, cannot be supported. As Baxter 
and Buergenthal convincingly argue, nothing in the Protocol’s drafting history shows the 
intention to exclude anti-plant chemicals. The travaux preparatoires also reveal that had 
the drafters known about anti-plant chemicals, they would have included them.79 While 
no consensus exists regarding the scope of the Geneva Protocol, it is arguable that the 
Protocol does prohibit the use in warfare of anti-plant chemicals, or herbicides.
76 Robert J. Mathews and Timothy L.H. McCormack, ‘Controlling the Weapons of War: The Relationship 
Between International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control’ in Helen Durham and Timothy L.H. 
McCormack (eds), The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law 
(1999) 65, 77.
77 See ibid, 73, 77.
78 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of  
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, supra note 47, 158-9.
79 R.R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925’ (1970) 64 
American Journal of International Law 853, 866-7.
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This is not to suggest that American use of herbicides in Vietnam is a violation of 
the Geneva Protocol, the simple reason being that the U.S. was not a party to the Protocol 
by  the  time  of  the  Vietnam war.  The  argument,  however,  is  that  the  prohibition  of 
herbicides,  and  toxic  chemicals  in  general,  as  enshrined  in  the  Geneva Protocol  had 
become  a  customary  rule,  and  as  such,  did  apply  to  the  U.S.’s  herbicides  use.  A 
customary prohibition on chemical  warfare was largely recognized already during the 
negotiations  of  the  Geneva  Protocol.  Hans  Blix,  when  examining  the  travaux 
preparatoires of the Protocol, ‘gained the impression that the majority of delegates felt 
they were largely  confirming  an existing prohibition’.80 State practice and  opinio juris 
subsequent to the enactment of the Geneva Protocol support this view. Indeed, since the 
adoption of the Geneva Protocol, states, including and particularly the U.S., have largely 
refrained from the use of chemical weapons in armed conflicts, including during World 
War II, despite their ability to use such weapons.81 The employment of these weapons by 
the Italians  in Ethiopia and the Japanese in China in no way proves a contrary state 
practice because, for the ICJ has noted that ‘instances of State conduct inconsistent with a 
given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications 
of the recognition of a new rule’.82 This consistent practice is accompanied by recognition 
that a rule of law existed that prohibited the use of chemical weapons. Such recognition 
can  be  found  in  declarations  and  policies  of  states,  and  also  in  denials  of  use  or 
accusation that other states’ allegations against oneself are slanders, for ‘allegations of 
[legal weapons] use … could not in themselves bear a slanderous connotation’.83 The 
opinio juris element is additionally supplemented by Resolution 2162 B (XXI) adopted in 
1966 by the UN General Assembly, with no negative vote and only four abstentions. The 
resolution ‘calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives’ of the 
Geneva Protocol and ‘condemns all actions contrary to those objectives’.84  
80 Hans Blix, Memorandum on a General Assembly Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of Biological 
and Chemical Warfare (1969), quoted in SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A  
Study of the Historical, Technical, Military, Legal and Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible  
Disarmament Measures, Volume III (CBW and the Law of War) (1973), 105.
81 SIPRI, ibid, 108-9.
82 Military and Paramilitary case, para.186.
83 See SIPRI, supra note 79, 106.
84 UN General Assembly Resolution Res. 2162 B (XXI) (5 December 1966).
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The  discussion  so  far  has  not  taken  into  account  the  case  of  the  ‘persistent 
objector’. While customary international law applies to all states, they can still ‘opt out’ 
by resisting the emerging rule,  and as such be a ‘persistent objector’.  The ‘persistent 
objector’ principle is widely recognized, but rarely claimed, except in the  Asylum and 
Fisheries cases.85 In the Asylum Case,86 the ICJ rejected the claim that a customary rule 
should be applied against Peru on the grounds that Peru has refrained from ratifying two 
conventions which were claimed to have become customary law. A similar argument can 
be  made  to  exclude  the  U.S.  from the  application  of  the  prohibition  on  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  since  it  has  likewise  not  ratified  the  Geneva  Protocol.  However 
attention must be paid to the formulation of the ICJ’s statement, though only in passing, 
that Peru ‘far from having its attitude adhered to … has refrain[ed] from ratifying’ the 
conventions. This is arguably a two-tiered requirement – to show an attitude against and 
not to ratify a treaty – a state must meet to be accepted as a persistent objector. The U.S., 
in the case of the Geneva Protocol, cannot be said to have satisfied this. True, it has not 
ratified the Protocol. Yet, its attitude towards a ban on the use of chemical weapons is not 
total  rejection. Indeed, the U.S. signed and ratified the Treaty of Washington of 1922 
which included such a ban, though the Treaty never entered into force. It also signed the 
Geneva Protocol and refrained from using chemical weapons during World War II in 
spite of their military significance. President Roosevelt, in 1943, even declared that use of 
such weapons was ‘outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind’.87 The U.S. 
cannot therefore be accepted as a persistent objector to the prohibition as enshrined in the 
Geneva Protocol. Furthermore, the persistent objector principle was accepted in both the 
Asylum and  Fisheries cases in relation to regional customs. But as Georges Abi-Saab 
argues,  the  principle  can  only be  a  ‘transient  phenomena’  when it  comes  to  general 
international law like humanitarian law.88
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is  that  the Geneva 
Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons has crystallized into customary law and 
85 Ted L. Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 457, 458-463.
86 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Reports 266, 278.
87 See SIPRI, supra note 79, 113-4.
88 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary 
Reflexions’ in Delissen and Tanja, supra note 49, 124-5.
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is therefore binding on the U.S.. The use of herbicides in the war in Vietnam is a clear 
violation of this customary prohibition.
2.3.2 Prohibition on the Use of Herbicides under the Hague Regulations
The limitations on the use of weapons in warfare are governed by the principle 
that the only legitimate object in war is to weaken the military force of the enemy; and 
that to that end it is sufficient to make the largest number of men  hors de combat by 
injuring them by means that do not uselessly aggravate their sufferings or render their 
death inevitable.89 This principle  can be found in the text of Article 22 of the Hague 
Regulations which reads: ‘The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy 
is not unlimited’, and is put into more details in Article 23. It is useful to quote the parts 
of this article relevant to our present purpose:
Article 23
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden – 
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
…
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering;
Each of these two provisions will be examined in turn.
2.3.2.1 Prohibition on the Use of Poison or Poisoned Weapons
The prohibition against the employment of poison or poisoned weapons dates far back in 
the history of warfare. Indeed, their use is regarded as perfidious and cruel, 90 and for that 
reason found its prohibition explicitly in the 1863 Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, better known as the Lieber Code, Article 70 of 
which provides that ‘[t]he use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or 
arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare’. A similar prohibition is found in the 
Hague Regulations as quoted above. Article 23(a) is quite straightforward and seems to 
apply without  difficulty to the use of herbicides.  It  is,  however,  not that simple.  The 
Hague Regulations does not include a definition of ‘poison or poisoned weapon’. The 
89 Greenspan, supra note 57, 353.
90 See Antonio Cassese, ‘Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law’ in Antonio Cassese (ed) 
The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) 161, 169.
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argument has therefore been made that herbicides are not poison, are not designed and 
intended for use against humans, and do not fall under the scope of the prohibition since 
herbicides  were  unknown at  the time.91 This  argument  cannot  stand for  a  number  of 
reasons. Firstly, while herbicides in their civilian use are not poison, the same cannot be 
said of their use in war in Vietnam. As indicated in Part II,  Agent Orange, the main 
defoliant used in Vietnam, was contaminated with dioxin, a substance generally seen as 
the most  toxic  substance  synthesized by man.   Arguably,  the fact  that Agent  Orange 
contains poison – dioxin – does not make it a poison because of its low levels of dioxin.  
It is the way Agent Orange was used that essentially transforms it into a poison. It was 
pointed out earlier that Agent Orange was sprayed in its undiluted form – 6 to 25 times 
more concentrated than normal suggested rate – which means its dioxin concentration is 
as  many  times  higher  than  its  civilian  use.  Moreover,  many  areas  in  Vietnam were 
sprayed more than ten times with Agent Orange. This multiplies the level of toxicity of 
Agent Orange use in Vietnam, and makes it difficult to assert that Agent Orange is not a 
poison. 
Secondly,  the  fact  that  herbicides  are  designed  and  intended  for  use  to  clear 
vegetation does not prima facie exclude it from being used against humans. Looking back 
one can find that the poison gas used in Nazi concentration camps to kill Jews, Zyklon B, 
had its legitimate civilian use as a pesticide. Again, it is the way in which the chemical is 
used that is decisive in ascertaining its legality. Obviously, the use of Zyklon B by the 
Nazis was intended to kill humans. The same cannot be said with ease with regard to 
Agent Orange. The fundamental question that needs to be answered is whether Agent 
Orange was used with the intention to kill  or injure humans.  It  turns on the difficult  
problem of intent, which deserves some consideration before we proceed.
Every student of law is all too familiar with the notions of actus reus and mens 
rea, the two elements of a crime. Also familiar to them is the difficulty in ascertaining the 
mens rea, the mental element, or the intention to commit the offense with the knowledge 
that the act is a crime. The same problem is posed to the process of evaluating whether or 
not an international crime has been committed. One may look to the debate on the crime 
of genocide for some guidance.  The 1948 Genocide Convention defines the crime of 
genocide  as  ‘acts  committed  with  intent  to  destroy,  in  whole  or  in  part,  a  national, 
91 See VAVA v Dow et al., 58-60, 182-7.
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ethnical, racial, or religious group’.92 Here, the requirement to prove certain intent of the 
perpetrator would not be too much of a problem in extreme cases like the Nazis’ killing 
of Jews during World War II since there was clear evidence found in their Final Solution 
and its plans and in their anti-Semitic propaganda.93 But in most cases, proving intent is 
problematic. As Kuper points out, ‘[g]overnments hardly declare and document genocidal 
plans in the manner of the Nazis’. He sees the intent requirement as a possibly easy way 
out  for  perpetrators  of  genocide.94 This,  however,  is  only one way to  look at  intent. 
Absent the clear ‘Nazi-style’ intent, Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, suggests ‘studying the 
facts objectively, to discover implicit in them such a genocidal intention’.95 This view is 
shared by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In the Akayesu case, 
relying on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the ICTR said that absent a confession by the accused, intention can be ‘inferred 
from a number of presumptions of facts’, including the scale and general nature of the 
atrocities,  the  general  political  doctrine  of  the  perpetrators  and  the  repetition  of 
discriminatory  and  destructive  acts.96 To  the  same  effect,  Robert  Gellately  and  Ben 
Kiernan succinctly argue that intent can also be found through
acts of destruction that are not the specific goal but are predictable outcomes or 
by-products  of  a  policy,  which  could  have  been avoided by a  change in  that 
92 Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) reads: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
93 Joy Gordon, ‘When Intent Makes All the Difference in the World: Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the 
Accusation of Genocide’ (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 57, 60.
94 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (1981), 35 cited in ibid, 62.
95 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘On Genocide’ (1968) in Richard A. Falk et al. (eds) Crimes in War: A Legal, Political-
Documentary and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of Leaders, Citizens, and Soldiers for  
Criminal Acts in Wars (1971) 534, cited in Lawrence J. LeBlanc, ‘The Intent to Destroy Groups in the 
Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding’ (1984) 78 American Journal of International  
Law 369, 381.
96 See Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals’ 
(2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 578, 585.
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policy.  Deliberate pursuit of any policy in the knowledge that it would lead to 
destruction of a human group thus constitutes genocidal intent.97
What can be drawn from this discussion is that when the intent of an act cannot be 
found  in  government  statements  or  in  obvious  propaganda,  it  can  be  ascertained  by 
looking  at  the  design  of  the  act  and  the  way it  was  carried  out.  While  some,  most 
prominently  Sartre,  have  examined  American  actions  in  Vietnam  and  discerned  a 
genocidal intent, it will only be argued here that the U.S. used Agent Orange as a not 
merely anti-plant but also anti-personnel weapon. Obviously,  the U.S. never conceded 
that Agent Orange was used to injure people. But herbicides were sprayed in a manner 
that showed intent to cause injuries to humans. As indicated above, Agent Orange was 
sprayed  in  its  concentrated  form for  many times  over  certain  areas,  with  the  aim of 
defoliating the jungle. A ‘by-product’ of this process is the injuries it caused to people 
exposed to it. Using Gellately and Kiernan’s standards, the question that arises is whether 
the U.S. had the knowledge that the use of Agent Orange the way it was could injure 
people. Evidence shows that it had. In his book,  Agent Orange on Trial, Peter Schuck 
reveals that already in 1952, Monsanto, one of the largest providers of Agent Orange to 
the  U.S.  army,  informed  army  officials  that  2,4,5-T  was  contaminated  by  a  toxic 
substance.  In  1963,  the  army’s  review  of  toxicity  studies  on  2,4,5-T  found  some 
increased risk of chloracne and respiratory irritations,  which is heightened when high 
concentrations  is  applied.  Also  in  1963 the  President’s  Science  Advisory Committee 
reported to the Joint Chief of Staff  on the possible  health  dangers of herbicide use.98 
Study of documents in the U.S. National Archives also indicates that military officials 
knew  in  1967  of  the  potential  long-term  health  risks  of  frequent  spraying.99 The 
Department of Defense and Department of State were allegedly informed in 1969 of a 
scientific research that showed that 2,4,5-T caused birth defects in mice,  but chose to 
keep  it  secret.100 Evidence  can  also  be  found  in  military  practice.  The  U.S.  army 
97 Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, ‘The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide’ in Robert Gellately and 
Ben Kiernan (eds) The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (2003) 3, 15.
98 Schuck, supra note 28, 17.
99 See Paul L. Sutton, The History of Agent Orange Use in Vietnam: An Historical Overview from the  
Veteran’s Perspective (2002) Paper presented at the United States – Vietnam Scientific Conference on 
Human Health and Environmental Effects of Agent Orange/Dioxins, March 3-6, 2002, in Hanoi, Vietnam, 
available at http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/files/A%20%20HISTORY%20OF%20AGENT%20ORANGE
%20USE.pdf
100 John Lewallen, Ecology of Devastation: Indochina (1971), 115.
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considered Agent Orange to be ‘relatively non-toxic’,101 but would not, in principle, let its 
troops into sprayed areas six weeks after the spray,102 obviously for fear of its toxic effect. 
The  Australian  army’s  ‘Instructions  for  Spraying  Herbicides’  also  indicated  that 
‘systemic poisoning with fatal results’ can be caused by ‘continued absorption, inhalation 
or  swallowing  of  the  spray’.103 But  probably  the  clearest  evidence  of  the  U.S.  prior 
knowledge of Agent Orange’s health effects is found in a letter to U.S. Senator Thomas 
Daschle from Dr. James Clary, an Air Force scientist. It deserves quotation here:
When we (military scientists) initiated the herbicide program in the 1960’s, we 
were  aware  of  the  potential  for  damage  due  to  dioxin  contamination  in  the 
herbicide.  We were even aware that  the  ‘military’  formulation  had a  higher 
dioxin concentration than the ‘civilian’ version, due to the lower cost and speed 
of manufacture. However, because the material was to be used on the ‘enemy’, 
none of us were overly concerned.104
It is thus clear that the U.S. army had full knowledge of the potential harm Agent 
Orange  can  cause  to  human  health.  Nevertheless,  it  deliberately  continued  with  the 
spraying of the herbicide, and this clearly constitutes intent to use Agent Orange as an 
anti-personnel weapon. This leads us to the conclusion that even though Agent Orange 
was designed and intended primarily for defoliation, it was also used as a poison against 
humans, and therefore is a violation of Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations.
Thirdly, the assertion that herbicides were unknown to the drafters of the Hague 
Regulations and that they could not, as a result, have intended to include herbicides under 
the scope of Article 23(a), cannot be supported. The fact that herbicides did not exist at 
the time of the Hague Conferences does not mean it is excluded from the scope of the 
Regulations. Indeed, the ICJ dealt with the matter of modern weaponry in the Legality of  
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Having been criticized for 
101 Department of the Army Training Circular, Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke,  
Antiplant Agents, and Personel Detectors in Counterguerilla Operations (TC 3-16 April 1969), reprinted in 
Wilcox, supra note 6, 186.
102 Wilcox, supra note 6, 39.
103 Ibid, 62-3.
104 See Senator Thomas Daschle’s Statement before the U.S. Senate’s Session on ‘Agent Orange: Ten Years  
of Struggle’ on November 21, 1989, available from the Library of Congress website at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r101:8:./temp/~r101tFvHLx:e0: 
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various reasons,105 the opinion is, however, correct in this respect. The Court was of the 
view that international humanitarian law applies to ‘all forms of warfare and to all kinds 
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future’.106 In addition, 
the Martens clause, whose significance was discussed in Part III, provides ‘an affirmation 
that the principles and rules of humanitarian law’107 apply to new weapons.
2.3.2.2  Prohibition on the Use of Weapons that Cause Unnecessary Suffering
Having argued that the use of Agent Orange constituted a violation of the Hague 
Regulations’  proscription of poison, we now turn to examining its compatibility with 
Article 23(e) which prohibits the use of weapons that is ‘calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering’. It must be noted here that this is the text of the 1907 Hague Regulations. In the 
1899 text,  the phrase ‘calculated  to  cause’ was instead ‘of  a  nature to  cause’,  which 
according to the ICRC, is the correct translation from the authentic French text.108 This 
means a lower standard of proof of intent is required to find a violation. Hence, the level 
of intent proved above is arguably more than sufficient to satisfy this requirement. What 
then is meant by ‘unnecessary suffering’? The Regulations did not provide any definition. 
Nor did it list specific weapons that could cause ‘unnecessary suffering’. Guidance can, 
however, be found elsewhere. It is widely acknowledged that the sole legitimate aim of 
warfare is to weaken the enemy by disabling the largest number of its military forces. 
Therefore,  as  stated  in  the  1868 Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg,  ‘this  object  would  be 
exceeded  by  the  employment  of  arms  which  uselessly  aggravate  the  sufferings  of 
disabled men or render their death inevitable’.109 Even though this does not provide much 
clarification to the concept of ‘unnecessary suffering’,110 it would suffice for our present 
105 See, eg, Timothy L.H. McCormack, ‘A Non liquet on Nuclear Weapons – The ICJ Avoids the 
Application of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law’ (1997) 316 International Review of  
the Red Cross 76.
106 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para.86.
107 Ibid, para.87.
108 International Committee of the Red Cross, Comments on Informal Working Paper on War Crimes of  
October 13, 1997 (1997), 3 quoted in Roger S. Clark, ‘Methods of Warfare that Cause Unnecessary 
Suffering or Are Inherently Indiscriminate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Berman’ (1998) 28 California 
Western International Law Journal 379, 383.
109 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 
reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, supra note 47, 54.
110 For a discussion of efforts to create standards necessary for the review of weapons that could cause 
unnecessary suffering, and for references to this subject, see Donna Marie Verchio, ‘Just Say No! The 
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purpose. Agent Orange as was used in Vietnam caused, among others, cancerous diseases 
and birth defects. Its health effects is not limited to the individual but are passed on to 
his/her offspring. Probably no rational person would agree that injuring the children of an 
enemy combatant  is  necessary  in  war.  Hence  the  conclusion  that  Agent  Orange is  a 
weapon that ‘uselessly aggravate’ its victims’ sufferings, and as such violate Article 23(e) 
of the Hague Regulations. 
2.3.3 The Use of Herbicides and the Principle of Distinction
One of the fundamental principles of the law of war is the principle of distinction. 
The principle, which has found general acceptance as a customary rule since the second 
half  of  the  19th century,111 provides  that  a  distinction  must  always  be  made  between 
military and non-military targets and between combatants and non-combatants,  112 and 
non-combatants must not be made the target of attack unrelated to military operations.113 
Or in the words of the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, ‘a distinction 
must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of 
the  civilian  population  to  the  effect  that  civilians  are  spared as  much  as  possible’.114 
Consequently,  states  must  ‘never  use  weapons  that  are  incapable  of  distinguishing 
between civilian and military targets’.115 Therefore, as Judge Higgins of the ICJ points 
out, ‘a weapon will be unlawful  per se if it is incapable of being targeted at a military 
objective only, even if collateral harm occurs.’116
Are  then  herbicides,  as  they  were  used  in  Vietnam,  a  weapon  capable  of 
distinguishing between civilian and military targets? For the purpose of discussion, it is 
assumed  that  the  jungle  and  the  environment  more  generally  are  legitimate  military 
SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, But Unnecessary and Superflous’ (2001) 51 Air Force Law Review 183.
111 Frits Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare: A Summary of Its Recent History and Trends in Development 
(1973), 31.
112 Richard A. Falk, ‘Chapter 1’ in Peter D. Trooboff (ed) Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The Vietnam 
Experience (1975) 37, 40.
113 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29 British Yearbook of  
International Law 360, 365.
114 See Arthur W. Rovine, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ 
(1973) 67 American Journal of International Law 118, 122.
115 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 78.
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targets, although this assertion is much disputed.117 Even with such an assumption, the 
answer to this question is in the negative. It is widely acknowledged that the spreading 
effects of persistent chemicals, like dioxin contained in Agent Orange, are very difficult 
to control.118 They contaminate the soil and the water sources and might spread hundreds 
of kilometers away from the area of use, affecting people indiscriminately.119 Moreover, 
herbicides when sprayed from aircrafts can be drifted far away from the target area. This 
was first reported by the Ranch Hand pilots themselves.120 The U.S. Mission in Saigon 
acknowledged  this  problem  and  estimated  that  herbicides  were  drifted  ‘up  to  10 
kilometers  and  more’.121 But  American  biologists  have  observed  damage  caused  by 
herbicide spray some 30 miles away from the target area.122 This ensured indiscriminate 
effects on the civilian population who are either directly sprayed upon or absorb the toxic 
chemicals through inhalation or through use of contaminated water or plants. 
2.3.4 The Use of Herbicides was Disproportionate
Clearly, compliance with the principle of distinction does not provide guarantee 
for the safety of civilians. In fact, if civilians are found near a legitimate military target, 
civilian casualties are hardly avoidable. There is a customary requirement in the law of 
war  that  the  casualties  suffered  by  civilians  must  not  be  disproportionate  to  the 
anticipated military advantage gained by the attack.123 This principle of proportionality 
117 See, eg, Richard A. Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare and Ecocide’ (1974) 173 Bulletin of Peace Proposals  
1, and Arthur H. Westing, ‘Proscription of Ecocide: Arms Control and the Environment’ (1974) 30 Bulletin  
of Atomic Scientists 24, both reprinted in Richard A. Falk, supra note 7, Vol. 4, 283. It is important to note 
that though destruction of the environment was not prohibited in treaty form at the time of the Vietnam 
War, 1977 Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions includes such a prohibition in Article 55, 
which reads
Article 55 – Protection of the natural environment
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe 
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods and means of warfare which are intended or may be 
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment …
118 Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/7575/Rev.1; S/9292/Rev.1 (1969), para.30.
119 Ibid.
120 Jock McCulloch, The Politics of Agent Orange: The Australian Experience (1984), 20.
121 See Sutton, supra note 100.
122 See Lewallen, supra note 101, 66.
123 Judith Gail Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ (1993) 87 American Journal of  
International Law 391, 400.
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also applies in relation to combatants, the essence of which, in Pictet’s words, is that 
‘belligerents shall not inflict on their adversaries harm out of proportion to the object of 
warfare, which is to destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy’.124 Thus the 
use of poison and weapons that cause unnecessary suffering can be considered to be 
disproportionate to the military object. Since attention has been paid to these aspects in 
previous sections, we will only focus here on the principle of proportionality in relation 
to the civilian population.
How, then, is the principle of proportionality to be understood? Judge Higgins 
says that ‘even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties 
would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack’.125 A committee 
set up by the ICTY also emphasized the need to ‘ensure that the losses to the civilian 
population and the damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete 
and  direct  military  advantage  anticipated’.126 These  are  only  two formulations  of  the 
principle which as other similar wordings are ‘couched in very vague terms’ and cannot 
provide any standard for evaluation of certain conducts of warfare.127 However, no matter 
how the principle is formulated, it can still be used in evaluating certain important cases. 
Robert McNamara,  former U.S. Secretary of Defense, for one, is of the view that the 
bombings  of Japanese cities  during World  War II,  which destroyed  50-70% of  those 
cities,  are  clearly  disproportionate.128 The  nuclear  bombs  dropped  on  Nagasaki,  and 
arguably on Hiroshima, fall in the same category.129 And as will be argued here, the use 
of  herbicides  in  Vietnam inflicted  harm out  of  proportion  to  the  military  advantage 
gained.
It  is important  to first examine how proportionality can be construed. Bernard 
Brown suggests that one needs to look at different interpretations of ‘military advantage’ 
because they are decisive in evaluating the conformity of an action with the principle of 
124 Pictet, supra note 48, 31.
125 Judge Higgins, supra note 117, para.20.
126 See Joseph Holland, ‘Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and Dynamics’ 
(2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 35, 51.
127 Cassese, supra note 89, 165.
128 The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, Documentary produced and 
directed by Errol Morris.
129 See Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970), 143.
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proportionality.130 He agrees with Tom Farer that this can be done by looking at military 
advantage on a case-by-case or cumulative basis.131 Farer, however, not only looked at 
military advantage, but referred to ‘the relation between value destruction and military 
advantage’.132 He  suggests  that  proportionality  is  to  be  assessed  by  examining  this 
relationship, and that 
instances of value destruction that appear grossly disproportionate when viewed 
from a narrowly tactical perspective may seem militarily essential  and hence 
proportional when examined in light of broad strategic alternatives.133
Based on this distinction, Farer goes on to argue that in counter-insurgency efforts, some 
actions can be seen as disproportionate because the casualties caused to civilians may 
exceed  the  injury  inflicted  on  the  insurgents.  But  the  same  actions,  if  carried  out 
relentlessly over a period of time will increase the casualties of insurgents and reduce 
their efficacy, and hence be proportionate.134 A similar line of argument is made by Judith 
Gardam in direct  relation  to the use of herbicides  in Vietnam. She asserts  that  ‘each 
defoliating  mission  achieved  little  in  itself  but  resulted  in  civilian  casualties  and 
widespread damage to civilian objects’, but ‘if the military advantage of the cumulative 
effect of these attacks in the long term was the criterion, then the overall civilian losses 
and damage to civilian objects may not have been excessive’.135 Gardam is correct in the 
first part of her argument. But she, like Farer and Brown, only looks at the cumulative 
military advantage brought about by an action or series of actions, yet forgets to examine 
the  cumulative  or  long-term ‘value  destruction’  caused  by the  same  actions.  This  is 
particularly important when assessing the use of herbicides in Vietnam. 
The  long-term  cumulative  effects  of  herbicides  have  been  alluded  to  before. 
Obviously,  they,  especially  Agent  Orange,  have  caused  fatal  diseases  to  millions  of 
civilians exposed to them. They have also destroyed vast areas of plantation, some of 
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which even to date have not been able to redevelop. They have contaminated, and remain 
persistent  in  the  water  and  the  soil.  And  as  the  American  Herbicide  Assessment 
Commission observed, ‘it may take many decades for most of the damaged hardwood 
forests  to  recover’,  and  that  herbicide  use  ‘has  caused extensive  and perhaps  lasting 
damage to vegetation’.136
It may be tempting to say that despite all this, the military advantage gained by 
the defoliation missions combined would make the destructions proportionate. Such an 
assertion,  however,  can find little  support.  The chief  official  of  the British Advisory 
Mission  to  Vietnam  reportedly  said  at  a  meeting  with  Kennedy  in  1963  that  the 
defoliation  brought  ‘dubious’  military  advantages.137 Along  the  same  line,  L.  Craig 
Johnstone, head of the Pacification Studies Group for the Military Assistance Command 
in  Vietnam between 1965 and 1970,  contends that  herbicide  spray had only ‘limited 
utility’, only created ‘at most a logistical inconvenience’, and revealed that captured Viet 
Cong documents showed only their concern for the health effects of herbicides, not any 
strategic concern.138 There were even complaints from the South Vietnamese army that 
the defoliation made their own troops more vulnerable to ambush from which there was 
no shelter.139 Indeed, one may expect that William Buckingham’s comprehensive book, 
Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides  in Southeast Asia 1961-1971, 
which  is  seen  as  an  official  history  of  the  operation,  will  provide  evidence  of  the 
effectiveness of the operation,  at least of how the spraying resulted in decreased Viet 
Cong  attacks  or  other  incidents.  However,  nothing  can  be  found  there  to  prove  the 
military advantage gained by the operation. As Koppes noted
[c]uriously for a war in which the Pentagon had statistics for everything, from 
kill  ratios  to  bars  of  soap distributed,  there  seems  to  be little  solid  data  on 
136 See Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Impact of the 
Vietnam War, Document prepared for the use of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (June 30, 
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herbicides' effectiveness in military operations ... If they exist Buckingham does 
not reveal them.140
It would be difficult to understand why Buckingham would not reveal the data, had they 
been  available,  if  they  could  show  how  effective  the  whole  operation  was.  Hence, 
available evidence does not support the contention that the military advantages gained 
from the defoliation operation can outweigh the damage caused.
2.4  The use of herbicides during the Vietnam War amounts to war crime and crime 
against humanity
As shown above, the use of herbicides by the US military during the Vietnam war clearly 
a violation of the international humanitarian law, so the next task is to determine that 
whether such violation is characterized as war crime or crime against humanity:
2.4.1 War Crime
War crime is defined as serious violations the rules of customary and treaty law 
pertaining  the  humanitarian  law.  The  concept  of  war  crimes  is  divided  into  two  principal 
categories: ‘The Grave Breaches System’ and ‘Violations of the Laws or Customs of War’.
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute  provides that: The International Tribunal shall have 
the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons 
or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments; (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (e) compelling 
a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (f) 
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and 
regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a 
civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.
140 Koppes, supra note 136, 134. 
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Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY provides for jurisdiction for violation of the 
laws or customs of war. Such violations include: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering; (b)wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or bombardment,
by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments
and works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property
Since civilians affected by the use of herbicides in Vietnam are not ‘those who, at 
a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are 
not  nationals’141,  it  is  obvious  that  the  grave  breach  of  the  Geneva  Convention  is 
irrelevant in this case.
Turning to Article 3 of the Statue, it can be seen that the legal base for Article 3 is the  
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 
Regulations annexed thereto, which mainly governs the means and methods of warfare.  
Following the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, the Trial Chamber confined the discussion of 
the  scope of Article 3 of the Statute to the question of whether the relevant norms form 
part  of  customary  international  law  and  whether  they  entail  individual  criminal 
responsibility. In rejecting application of the principle of legality the defence argued, The 
Trial Chamber explained that the residual character of Article 3 of the Statute should be 
understood as covering serious violations of international humanitarian law which at the 
time  of  their  alleged  commission  were  customary  in  nature  and  entailed  individual 
criminal responsibility.
The Trial Chamber also held that this interpretation of Article 3 of the Statute is in line 
with international customary law in force at the time of the alleged offences. According 
to contemporary customary law, violations  of the laws or customs of war encompass 
"war crimes". This term covers not only violations of "Hague law", but all violations of 
141 See the definition of protected persons,  Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
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"customary norms of humanitarian law entailing individual criminal responsibility"142. In 
other  words,  there  are  criminal  offence  for  individuals  who  are  responsible  for  the 
commission of war crime (in addition to state responsibility).
The  Trial  Chamber  found  support  for  this  conclusion  in  the  commentary  of  the 
International Law Commission to Article 20 of its 1994 Draft Statute of an International 
Criminal  Court143,  Article  85(5) of Additional  Protocol I,  Article  20 of the 1996 ILC 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind144, and finally in Article 
8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.145
In sum, although the  Statue of ICTY is designed to deal with the conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia, the interpretation and application of Article 3 of the Statue goes far beyond 
the context itself to reflect international customary law. 
As indicated earlier, the use of herbicides is a violation of the prohibitions of ‘the use of 
poison or poisonous weapons‘ and ‘use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering’. 
Thus, there is a ground to believe that such an act is a violation of Article 3 (a) of the 
ICTY. By the same way, the use of herbicides which inflicted damage on the surrounding 
environment (forest, villages…) above the threshold of the principle of proportionality 
can bee seen a violation of Article 3(b).  It is now sufficient to hold that use of herbicides 
during the Vietnam War as a violation of international customary law is war crime under 
international humanitarian law 
2.4.2 Crime against humanity 
Crimes against humanity is are universally prohibited under  international humanitarian 
law. Norms governing crimes against humanity have reached the level of jus cogens and 
142 Louis G. Maresca, ”Case Analysis: The Prosecutor v. Tadic The Appellate Decision of the ICTY and 
Internal Violations of Humanitarian Law as International Crimes” available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=207411
143 U.N. Doc. A/49/10
144 U.N. Doc. A/51/10
145 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)
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States’ obligation  to prosecute, punish or extradite the individuals responsible for crimes 
against humanity is erga omnes in nature.146
The legal basis for the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Statutes of the ad hoc
tribunals were the Nuremberg Charter, Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
Control  Council  Law  No.  10  for  Germany147.  Article  6  (c)  of  the  Charter  of  the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (1945) defines crimes against humanity as 
"murder,  extermination,  enslavement,  deportation,  and other inhumane acts committed 
against  any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated". 148 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute states: The International Tribunal shall have the power to 
prosecute  persons  responsible  for  the  following  crimes  when  committed  in  armed 
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population:  (a)  murder;  (b)  extermination;(c)  enslavement;  (d)  deportation;(e) 
imprisonment;  (f)  torture;  (g)  rape;  (h)  persecutions  on  political,  racial  and religious 
grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.
Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity do not require a nexus to any armed conflict 
In the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber held 
that  under  customary  international  law,  crimes  against  humanity  did  not  require  a 
connection to armed conflict.
For an act to be considered as constituting crimes against humanity, it has to meet: the 
requirement of attack being directed against any civilian population; the requirement of 
mens rea (mental element);  and the acts. We now should examine whether the use of 
herbicides during the Vietnam War fulfill such requirements.
146 Yusuf Askar, Implementing the International Humanitarian Law (2005), p. 240
147 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993),UN. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1, para. 47.
148 Article 5 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo is also in similar 
terms, added rape, imprisonment and torture to inhumane acts 
39
The requirement of ‘being directed against civilian population’: 
The US government argued that the primary purpose was to destroy the cover used by the 
enemy forces. However on the contrary, as shown above, with its prior knowledge that a 
herbicide with level of dioxin that is above the standard could have harmful effect on 
human health and environment,  the US still used such herbicides not merely to achieve 
its  stated  objective  but  to  inflict  harmful  and  indiscriminate  damage  on  civilian 
population  in  violation  of  the  principles  of  distinction  and  proportionality  of  the 
international humanitarian law.  Therefore,  it can be consider as ‘attack directed against 
civilian population’.
Even  the view that the jungle and the environment are legitimate military targets seem to 
be loosing its ground when examining the international law concerning the protection of 
environment in times of war, in particular the Article 55 of the Protocol Additional I to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
Article 55(1) provides that:
Care  shall  be  taken  in  warfare  to  protect  the  natural  environment  against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of 
the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to 
cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health 
and survival of the population.
This Article is understood to impose obligation on states not to use methods of warfare 
that may result in causing prohibited “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment”. Article 55(2) further stipulates the protection by prohibiting attacks 
against the natural environment by way of reprisals.
Because  the Protocol was adopted in 1977 after the Vietnam War, it is impossible to say 
that the used of herbicide is a violation of Article 55 of the Protocol. Thus, it is important 
to  examine  whether  it  is  to  be  part  of  customary  international  law.  The  emerging 
practices by states show it has reached that status as a number of State has expressly 
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prohibited such damage to the environment in the military manuals (Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Germany Kenya, New Zealand, Russia, Togo, United Kingdom, United States) 
and  legislations  (Australia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Canada,  Congo,  Croatia,  Germany, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom)
Before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Cases, States argued that they considered Articles 
55 to be customary, and that any party to a conflict must observe them, or must avoid 
using methods or means of warfare that would destroy or could have disastrous effects on 
the  environment149. The United  States  also stated  that  “US practice  does  not  involve 
methods of warfare that would constitute widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the  environment.”150
In the  Nuclear Weapons  case, the United Kingdom and the United States both argued 
against the customary status of the Article 55and the Court itself appeared to consider the 
rule  not  being  of  customary  law.151 Furthermore,  the  Final  Report  of  the  Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia  stated  that  Article  55  of  Additional  Protocol  I  “may…  reflect  current 
customary law”.152
France, United Kingdom and United States have persistently objected to the rule forming 
customary law as  they  apply  to  nuclear  weapons.  They have  each  indicated  through 
military manuals or reservations to the Protocol upon ratification that the rule apply to 
them only in regards to conventional weapons, but not nuclear weapons.153 It seems most 
likely therefore that the position of the ICRC in the Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law is the correct approach. It concluded that in light of such statements 
and practice, Article 55 is of customary nature only in regards to conventional weapons, 
but not nuclear weapons.154
149 See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 152.
150 United States, Letter from the Department of the Army to the legal adviser of the US Army forces 
deployed in the Gulf region. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Volume 1, Rules, at 153.
151 See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck,  supra note 149 153-154.
152 Ibid., 154.
153 Ibid., 154
154 Ibid., 154 -145.
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In  the  Tadic trial  decision,  the  phrase  ‘directed  against  civilian  population’  was 
interpreted as meaning that ‘that the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic basis, 
that there must be some form of governmental, organizational policy to commit these acts 
and that the perpetrator must know of the context within which his actions are take’155. 
With regard to the notion of ‘widespread or systematic attack’, the issue of whether these 
two concepts must be present at the same time or whether either of them is sufficient is 
dealt in the Tadic case. The trial expressly stated that ‘either one of these is sufficient to 
exclude isolated or random acts’156. 
Proof  of  policy,  plan  or  design  is  generally  considered  to  be  a  necessary element  to 
establish for crimes against humanity.157 This requirement is also met by looking at the 
way herbicide was sprayed as indicated above ( in high concentration not to defoliate as 
originally declared but  to cause injury to human).
The  requirement  of  ‘mens  rea’ (mental  element):  By  the  same  way  of  using  above 
analysis, the requirement is also met easily.
Lastly, the requirement of the acts: The last requirement of crimes against humanity is 
that  there  must  be  an  act  constituting  a  crime  against  humanity.  These  acts  are 
enumerated, in the same way, in Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes:
‘(a) murder;  (b) extermination; (c) enslavement;  (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment;  (f) 
torture;  (g)  rape;  (h)  persecutions  on  political,  racial  and religious  grounds;  (i)  other 
inhumane acts’158. While some offences like murder are very clear and easy to apply, 
while some others are vague such as ‘other humane acts’ and needed to clarify by basing 
on the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. In order to define the concept of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ not to violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Tribunal  in Tadic case 
relied on the  definition made in Article 18 (k) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code which states: 
‘other  inhumane  acts  which  severely  damage  physical  or  mental  integrity,  health  or 
155 This was reaffirmed in the decision of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999, para. 248, 124 ILR, pp. 61, 
164.
156 See Tadic case, sect. VI.D.2.ii.a.
157 Yusuf, supra note 145, p.250
158 Art. 7 (1) of the ICC Statute.
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human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm’159.  Along this line, therefore, 
it should be concluded now that the use of herbicides constitutes crime against humanity 
shoul fall under the category of ‘other inhumane acts’, particularly when used at such 
extreme toxic level and at such intensity as the Agent Orange in Vietnam.
159 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, para. 729.
43
Chapter 3: Redress
Since  the  use  of  herbicides  by the  US military  during  the  Vietnam war  is  clearly  a 
violation of customary international law as indicated above, the US  government should 
provide redress for the acts committed against Vietnamese civilian people. Redress could 
be  compensation  to  the  victims  by  the  US government.  Alternatively,  compensation 
could also be sought by Vietnamese government on behalf of its people who were the 
victims of  agent orange sprayed by the US military. In addition, government and military 
personnel  should  also  be  prosecuted  for  their  culpability  in  the  herbicides  operation 
although such an option seems quite impossible given the current state of affairs between 
the US and Vietnam.
3.1  Individual criminal liability
Precedents  of such prosecution  has quite a long history.  The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals are the first international tribunals charging individual military officers, their 
commanding officers, and the German and Japanese Governments for committing war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. At Nuremberg, there war a defence contention that 
individuals could not be held responsible for the acts of states. However, that argument 
was rejected in the Judgement of Nuremberg Tribunal by stating that ”international law 
imposes  duties  and  liabilities  upon  individuals  as  well  as  states”  as  ”crime  against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals  who  commit  such  crimes  can  the  provisions  of  international  can  be 
enforced”160. The Charter of Tokyo Tribunal set out individual responsibility with regard 
to certain crimes.161  The United Nations General Assembly in 1946  reaffirmed that the 
principles  of  international  law  set  forth  in  the  Charter  of  the  International  Military 
Tribunal  and the Charter of the International  Military Tribunal  for the Far East were 
customary international law recognized by United Nations Members generally. 162 
According to  Oppenheim:  "the entire  law of  war  is  based on the assumption  that  its 
commands  are  binding  not  only  upon  States  but  also  upon  their  nationals,  whether 
members of their armed forces or not. To that extent no innovation was implied in the 
160 Nuremberg Judgment 1947, p. 223.
161 Article 5
162 Resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946,
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Charter annexed to the Agreement of 8 August 1945, for the punishment of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis inasmuch as it decreed individual responsibility for 
war crimes proper and for what it described as crimes against humanity ..."163 
The principle of individual responsibility has also been confirmed with regard to grave 
breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Red Cross Convention and 1977 Additional Protocols I 
and II dealing with armed conflicts. Under those conventions, High Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing or ordering to be committed any of a series of grave breaches.164 
Since it has been established the use of herbicides in Vietnam by US military amounts  
war crime and crimes against humanity, it should follow that   individual US officers and 
soldiers involved in such acts clearly can and should be punished for their crimes.
Furthermore, it is important to note that  US military and governmental officers are also 
liable for the use of herbicides during the Vietnam War sprayed by those soldiers and 
officers  under  their  command.  The  doctrine  of  command  responsibility  means  that 
military leader or someone acting as such is responsible for the conduct of those under 
his command or authority and over whom he has effective control  given that he not only 
should but indeed is obliged to know what they are doing and to adopt the necessary and 
reasonable measures within his power to prevent or suppress the commission of unlawful 
acts; this obligation, plus the fact that the superior knows or had reason to know that the 
crime was going to be or had been committed and that there exists a superior–subordinate 
relationship, are the three constituent elements of command responsibility.165 
The principles underlying the doctrine had, however, emerged a long time ago. Around 
the 6th century BC, Sun Tzu wrote in “The Art of War” that it was a commander's duty to 
ensure that his subordinates conducted themselves in a civilised manner during an armed 
conflict. During the  American Civil War, in order to ensure accountability the “Lieber 
163 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, H. Lauterpacht (ed.), 7th ed. (London, New York: 
Longmans Green, 1948-1952), sect. 153.
164 See article 49 of the First Geneva Convention, article 50 of the Second Geneva Convention, article 129 
of the Third Geneva Convention and article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
165 Hortensia D. T. Gutierrez Posse, ”The relationship between international humanitarian law and the 
international criminal tribunals”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 88, Number 861, 2006, p.71
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Code imposed  criminal  responsibility  on  commanders  for  ordering  or  encouraging 
soldiers to wound or kill already disabled enemies”.166  The first international trial where 
a  commander  was charged on the basis  of  responsibility  for  an omission  was In Re 
Yamashita  before the United States  Military Commission.  General  Yamashita  was in 
command of the 14th Area Army of Japan in the Philippines, where his troops committed 
atrocities  against  hundreds  of  civilians.  Yamashita  was  charged  with  ’unlawfully 
disregarding and failing  to discharge his  duty as a  commander  to control  the acts  of 
members  of  his  command by permitting  them to commit  war  crimes'.167 In  the  High 
Command  Case,  the  United  States  Military  Tribunal argued  that  in  order  for  a 
commander to be criminally liable for the actions of his subordinates "there must be a 
personal dereliction" which "can only occur where the act is directly traceable to him or 
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence 
on his part," based upon "a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates 
amounting to acquiescence."168 The principle was most clearly articulated in several of 
the Nuremberg trials and in the post-war trial of US Colonel Medina for the 1969 My Lai 
massacre in Viet Nam.
 It  is  important  to  note   that  the  all  the  prosecutions  applied  pre-existing  customary 
norms. It is also important to note that mid-level US military officials who were involved 
in or responsible for the use of herbicides may not escape criminal liability by arguing  a 
"superior orders" defence, as such a claim may only be considered in mitigation of any 
punishment that is actually imposed.169
But  we  are  now  facing  with  the  question  of  which  court  have  jurisdiction  (forum 
conveniens)  to try US soldiers and officers who committed crimes relating to the use of 
herbicides  in Vietnam.  According to  article  146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,  a 
Contracting  Party to the Conventions  is  under an additional  obligation to "search for 
persons  alleged  to  have  committed,  or  to  have  ordered  to  be  committed,  ...  grave 
166 Eugenia Levine, Command Responsibility : The Mens Rea Requirement, Global Policy Forum, 
February 2005
167 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S.1 (1946) 13-14.
168 Ilias Bantekas , The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility , American Journal of International 
Law, No 3 July 1999
169 See generally Anthony D'Amato, "Superior orders vs. command responsibility", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 80, 1986, p. 604
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breaches"  and  to  "bring  such persons,  regardless  of  their  nationality,  before  its  own 
courts"170. This obligation may also be applied to States that are not parties to the Geneva 
Conventions to the extent that it now reflects customary international law applicable at 
least to all international armed conflicts.
Generally,  international law, states are allowed to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of 
territoriality171, active personality or nationality172, passive nationality173, universality.
Under the principle of territoriality,  Vietnam can be a location to persecute,  but such 
option has difficulty because given the current state of affairs between US and Vietnam, 
Vietnamese judicial authority may be reluctant to prosecute US soldiers and officers, or 
institute proceeding against individual that might eventually involve US organs. Under 
active nationality principle,  the United States can be also location to conduct criminal 
prosecutions. However, the point here is whether of the US has the will to do so. I don't 
think that is the case. 
As it was shown above that the use of herbicides by US military during the Vietnam war 
amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity, one might think that International 
Criminal Court (ICC) might be a forum to try American military personnel involve in 
170  Article 146
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact  any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the 
present  Convention  defined  in  the  following Article.  Each  High Contracting  Party shall  be  under  the  
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave  
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if  
it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to  
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a ' prima 
facie ' case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary 
to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which  
shall  not  be  less  favourable  than  those  provided  by  Article  105  and  those  following  of  the  Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
171 This principle reflects one aspects of national sovereignty.
172 This principle has two forms: (i) courts have jurisdiction over certain criminal offences committed by  
their national abroad, and (ii) jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals abroad is suborndinated to 
crime punishable under the law of the territorial state – the reason is the desire of the state of nationality not 
to extradite its nationals to the state where crimes has been perpetrated 
173 State may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad against their nationals
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such crimes as the Article 5 of The  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(which established the ICC) states that :
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international  community  as  a  whole.  The  Court  has  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  this 
Statute with respect to the following crimes: 
(a)     The crime of genocide; 
(b)     Crimes against humanity; 
(c)     War crimes; 
(d)     The crime of aggression.
However, the Court can only exercise its jurisdiction under limited circumstances174 : 
• where the person accused of committing a crime is a national of a state party (or 
where the person's state has accepted the jurisdiction of the court); 
• where the alleged crime was committed on the territory of a state party (or where 
the state on whose territory the crime was committed has accepted the jurisdiction 
of the court); or 
• where a situation is referred to the court by the UN Security Council.
Since both Vietnam and US are not State party to the Rome Statute, the only way that the 
case falls within the Court’s jurisdiction is that it should be referred by the UN Security 
Council.  In that case the US as permanent member will of course veto any resolution 
authorising the surrender of US military personnel to the Court. Thus it is impossible for 
ICC to have jurisdiction in the case of herbicides.
Other national courts of countries other than the US and Vietnam may also be available 
to hear criminal proceedings under the principle of universal jurisdiction. This principle 
allows each and every state jurisdiction to prosecute those committing henious crimes 
such as war crime, crime against humanity. The basis for this is that crimes are regarded 
as particularly offensive  to the international community as a whole.  While international 
law  permits  the  exercise  of  universal  jurisdiction,  enabling  national  legislation  is 
necessary  for  trials  to  be  conducted.  Some  countries  have  adopted,  usually  with 
limitations, a principle permitting jurisdiction over acts of non-nationals.175 
174 Article 12, 13 of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court
175 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th Ed), Oxford, 1998, p.307
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It is important to mention here the notion of ’supremacy and complementarity’  in the 
theory of international criminal law. The notion means that wherever national courts have 
established adequate procedural mechanisms to safeguard the rights of both the victims 
and  the  defendants,  national  prosecutions  for  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law 
violations may often be preferable to prosecutions before international tribunals. 
In some cases the egregious nature or massive scale of the violations may suggest that  
only a prosecution by an international tribunal would appropriately reflect the injury that 
the crimes inflicted on the global community.  This is particularly true with respect to 
proceedings  against  senior  political  or  military  leaders  who  were  accused  of  having 
committed or having ordered the commission of crimes on a massive scale in violation of 
jus cogens norms like war crime and crime against humanity.  As matters of universal 
concern  that  may be tried  in  any forum,  massive  criminal  violations  of   peremptory 
norms of customary international law are the concern of the international community as a 
whole and should, in these most extreme cases, be addressed in international criminal 
proceedings.
By way of custom, crimes against humanity and war crimes are not subject to any statute 
of limitations. They may not be extinguished by the passage of time. Indeed, in 1953, a 
United Nations report on international jurisdiction over crimes (A/2645)176 stated that a 
concept  of a statute of limitations  does not exist  in present international  law.  In the 
Barbie  prosecution,  the  French  Court  of  Cassation  similarly  held  that  customary 
international law did not recognize a statute of limitations for crimes against humanity. 
Additionally, treaty law confirms that the international community will not bar claims for 
egregious violations of international law, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
under statute of limitations concerns.
3.2  State responsibility and liability to pay compensation
Traditionally, a State as sovereign entity can do whatever it wants within its jurisdiction 
such as changing a law or making a new one (but today human rights and environmental 
law have led to some exceptions). But in addition to that internal autocracy, each and 
every  state  has  external  responsibility  to  fulfill  its  international  legal  duties  since 
responsibility for such duties is a criteria for a State to be qualified as a legal person of 
176 UN Doc. A/2645 (20 August 1953)
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the international law. For a State can not create international law in the same way it does 
to municipal law, it can not renounce its international duties unilaterally at discretion, but 
is  and  remain  legally  bound by them.177 Since  international  deliquency  is  defined  as 
neglect of an international legal duty, the violated State can, through reprisals, compel the 
deliquent to comply with international duties.
According  to  Oppenheim,  there  are  two  kinds  of  State  responsibility,  one  is  named 
“original” and the other “vicarious”.  Under a theory of "original liability", it is clear that 
a Government and its officials could be held liable for violations of international law for 
acts performed by a Government and "actions of the lower agents or private individuals 
as are performed at the Government's command or with its authorization".178  A State that 
is  originally  liable  for  a  violation  of  international  law  has  committed  an  act  of 
"international  delinquency".  An "international  delinquency"  consists  of "any injury to 
another  State  committed  by  the  Head  or  Government  of  a  State  in  violation  of  an 
international  legal  duty.  Equivalent  to  acts  of  the  Head  and Government  are  acts  of 
officials or other individuals commanded or authorized by the Head or Government".179 
The responsible State is then liable "to pay compensation for injurious acts of its officials 
which, although unauthorized, fall within the normal scope of their duties".180 Therefore, 
a State was considered liable for commission of an injury to an individual alien within its 
territory if  an agent of the State caused wrongful injury to that  individual.  Thus,  the 
United States is liable for the actions of its military and any of its agents, including the 
private individuals who ran and profited from the use of herbicides at the request of the 
US military. 
Under the “vicarious” responsibility, States are responsible for acts other than their own. 
The  rationale  behind  it  is  that  since  international   law  is  a  law between  States  and 
individuals  are  only  objects  of  international  law  (not  subjects  as  State),  therefore 
international law makes every State responsible for “certain acts of their agents, of their 
subjects, and even of such aliens as are for the time living within their territory”.181 
177 Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, section 140
178 Ibid, section 150
179 Ibid, section 152
180 Ibid., section 150
181 Ibid., section 140
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Under customary international law, States are liable for failing to act to prevent harm to 
aliens. Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, which reflected customary 
international law by the Second World War, reads as follows:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if 
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.  
This principle of responsibility and compensation has been described as an extension of 
the principle of  respondeat superior to the law of nations, making States liable for the 
acts of their military forces.182 Accordingly, each State has a duty to prevent, investigate, 
and punish gross human rights violations and violations of fundamental freedoms. The 
US Government,  therefore,  is  independently liable  for  failing  to  prevent  harm to  the 
victims of herbicides and to punish the offenders. 
Some  may  argue  that  because  conventional  international  law  is  deemed  to  regulate 
relationships between States, rather than relationships between individuals and States, no 
claim may be made against state by individual victims of the use of herbicides.  This 
argument, however, seems to have lost its ground since by the early 20 th century, it was 
recognized by international law that when a State injured the nationals of another State, it 
inflicted injury upon that foreign State and was therefore liable  for damages to make 
whole the injured individuals. 
Furthermore,  with  the  development  of  international  human  rights  law,  it  is  also 
recognized by international law that individuals are also "subjects of rights conferred and 
duties imposed by international law.".183 Mr. Theo van Boven (the Special Rapporteur of 
the Sub-Commission on the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law) wrote in his report that “all victims of serious violations of 
international law have a right to fair and adequate reparations, which shall render justice 
by removing or redressing the consequences of the wrongful acts and by preventing and 
deterring violations”184. Reparations, as defined in international law, mean all measures 
182 Frits Kalshoven, article 3 of the Convention (IV) concerning the Laws and Custom of War on Land, 
signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, in "Remembering what we have tried to forget", ASCENT, 1997, 
pp. 16-30
183 Oppenheim, supra note 168, sects. 1, 7.
184 UN document (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, para. 7)
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expected to be taken by a State which has violated international law, including payment 
of monetary compensation to victims, punishment of wrongdoers, apology or atonement, 
assurances of non-repetition, and other forms of satisfaction185. 
Mr.  van  Boven  concluded  that  statutes  of  limitations  for  the  consideration  of 
compensation claims shall not run during periods during which no effective remedies 
exist186.  He  also  noted  that  under  the  current  state  of  international  law,  civil  claims 
relating to reparations for gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law shall not 
be subject to statutes of limitations in any event187 . The internationally accepted principle 
that there are no statute of limitations barriers to the prosecution and compensation of 
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian.  
State  responsibility  can  only  be  engaged  for  breaches  of  an  international  obligation, 
whether  customary  or  deriving  from  treaty.  Responsibility  claims  were  traditionally 
brought directly between State at international level before international court or tribunal. 
Thus, theoretically, Vietnam is legally capable to bring its claim against the United States 
before the International Court of Justice . But it requires a consent by the US as a party to 
the dispute in question which I believe is never the case. International claims could also 
be enforced in national courts however whether they are successful relies on the legal 
approach of national legal system to international law as well as the rule immunity. 
3.2.1. Individual compensation
Many  people  around  the  world  have  repeatedly  expressed  their  view  that  the  US 
Government should recognize the nature and the extent of the violations of international 
law by using herbicides during the Vietnam War; acknowledge its responsibility for such 
acts;  and  compensate  for  individual  victims.  As  noted  above,   several  sources  of 
international  law,  including:  the  Hague Convention  No.  IV of  1907;  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference  of  1919  (Treaty  of  Versailles);  the  Charter  of  the  Tokyo  War  Crimes 
Tribunal;  and customary international law demonstrate the obligation of States to pay 
compensation for breaches of international law. In addition, as Theo van Boven noted in 
his  study,  a  State's  responsibility  for  breaches  of  international  obligations  implies  a 
185 Ian Brownlie, supra note 167, p.460
186 Supra note 178, para 9
187 Ibid
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similar  and  corresponding  right  on  the  part  of  individuals  to  compensation  for  such 
breaches. The Treaty of Versailles, for example, provided that individuals could bring 
claims for damages against Germany.
Article 3 of the Hague Convention 1907 provides individual persons with a right to claim 
compensation  for  damages  they  suffered  as  a  result  of  acts  in  violation  of  the 
Regulations. Although this language is not expressed in article 3, "the drafting history of 
the article leaves no room for doubt that this was precisely its purpose."188 Notably, while 
the  term  "reparation"  may  take  the  form  of  restitution,  indemnity,  monetary 
compensation  or  satisfaction,189 "Article  3  specifically  and  employs  the  term 
'compensation,'"  190which, by definition,  means "payment of a sum of money to make 
good  the  damage  ...".191 Thus,  "[t]he  use  of  this  term  instead  of  the  more  general 
'reparation' may be seen as yet another indication that ... the drafters of the article had in 
mind the case of individual persons, victims of the laws of war, who wish to bring a 
claim for the injury or damage they suffered."192 
In addition, in the Chorzów Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) held that if the situation prior to an act in violation of international law could not 
be restored (e.g. property returned), compensation must be paid.193 Since restoration of 
the  victims  of  herbicides  to  their  status  prior  to  this  violation  is  clearly  impossible, 
compensation  must  be  paid.  Other  PCIJ  decisions  similarly  confirm the  existence  in 
international law of rights including compensation for private individuals.194
188 Frits Kalshoven, supra note 173
189 Ibid.,
190 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
191 Ibid., p. 12.
192 Ibid., 
193 Chorzów Factory (Merits), Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Judgement No. 13, Series A, 
No. 8-17, 1927, p. 29.
194 PCIJ Advisory Opinion No. 15, Series B, No. 15, pp. 17-18.
53
In  short,  the  individual  victims  of  herbicides  sprayed  by the  US military  during  the 
Vietnam War clearly have a right to adequate compensation for the damage they have 
endured.
3.2.2 Corporate liability and civil suits for compensation
It  is  clear  that  with  the  violation  of  international  law  of  armed  conflict,  the  US 
government  has legal  responsibility  toward the Vietnamese victims.  However,  all  the 
possible  options  of  remedy  drawn above seem to  be  theoretical  until  there  are  legal 
institutions that are able and willing to address these claims. So the only avenue left for 
the Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange is  to bring civil suits against the involved US 
chemical corporations before judicial  tribunals for compensation under the Alien Tort 
Claims  Act  (ATCA).  But  before  examining  that  lawsuit  by  the  Vietnamese  victims 
against US chemical corporations, it  is important to explore the possibility of holding 
corporation liable for violations of humanitarian law which will be dealt with in next 
chapter.
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Chapter 4: Corporate civil liability for violation of international 
humanitarian law
So does corporate civil liability exist in international law? It is more interesting when it 
come together with violation of international humanitarian law.  Since corporate liability 
is quite a broad topic, I just want to address some aspects of the concept relating to the 
case  of  herbicides,  namely,  the  legal  bases  of  corporate  civil  liability;  the  issue  of 
complicity in the establishment of corporate civil liability for a violation of international 
humanitarian law.
4.1  Corporate obligations under international law
The  first  question  is  whether,  under  international  law,  non-state  actor  can  be  held 
accountable for violations of international humanitarian law and, if so, whether there is 
an duty to make reparation. 
Traditionally,  only  States  are  the  subjects  of  international  law.  In  other  words,  inter 
international law imposes duties and responsibilities on States only, not individual nor 
corporations.  However,  the fact is  that today non-state  actors play greater role in the 
international arena, for example armed groups and multinational companies, the position 
of this type of entity international law needs to be adjusted.  The great development of 
international human rights law after the Second  World War showed that international 
law  is  not  only  covering  interaction  among  states  but  also  those  among  states  and 
individuals.
Many international human rights document would seem to indicate that international law 
can confer duties on non-state actors. Some scholars195 interpret the use of the expression 
‘‘every  individual  and  every  organ  of  society’’196 in  the  preamble  of   the  Universal 
195 Louis Henkin argues that the expression ‘‘every organ of society’’ used in the Preamble to the Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  includes  legal  persons,  and  hence  companies,  and  that  the  Universal 
Declaration therefore applies to them. Cited in Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing 
International  Legal  Obligations of Companies,  International  Council on Human Rights Policy,  Versoix, 
2002, p. 58.
196“.. Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this  
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights  
and  freedoms  and  by  progressive  measures,  national  and  international,  to  secure  their  universal  and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples”
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Declaration of Human Rights as meaning that the drafters intended the provisions of the 
Declaration to be applicable to all non-state actors , including to corporation. Similarly, 
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which are binding treaties, contain in the first paragraph of their common 
Article 5 197 wording that clearly places ‘‘groups’’ under the obligation not to ‘‘engage in 
any  activity  or  perform  any  act  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  any  of  the  rights  and 
freedoms’’ recognized in the Covenants. 
In the same way, international criminal law and international humanitarian law since the 
Second World War has showed that international law applies not only to states but also to 
non-state  entities  and,  in  particular,  to  individuals.198 the  establishment  of  the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda by the UN 
Security  Council  and the adoption  of  the Rome Statute  establishing  the  International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has confirmed this trend. Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions and the provisions of Additional Protocol II apply directly and automatically 
to all parties to a conflict, including armed groups, provided that the conditions for their 
application are met.  Thus it is not conceptually problematic that international law applies 
to non-state actors, including corporations and that they have duties and responsibilities. 
Moreover,  the  obligations  on  corporations  are  set  forth  explicitly  in   a  number  of 
international conventions and treaties. Article 1 of is the International Convention on the 
Suppression  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Apartheid  refers  to  ‘‘organizations, 
institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid’’.199 The Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
stipulates that the Parties shall prohibit ‘‘all persons’’ from transporting or disposing of 
hazardous waste unless authorized or allowed to do so. Finally, provision is made for the 
liability  of  legal  persons  in  Article  10  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  against 
Transnational  Organized  Crime  200 adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  in  2000.  It  is 
197 ‘‘Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right  to engage in any activity or to perform any act  aimed at  the destruction of any of the rights  or  
freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present 
Covenant.’’
198 See above
199 Article 1, para. 2: ‘‘The States Parties to the present Convention declare criminal those organizations 
institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid.’’
200 A/RES/55/25.
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evident that an act of corporation in some contexts can commit a crime or a civil wrong 
under international law 
In addition,  there are a number of ‘‘soft law’’ instruments that deal exclusively with the 
responsibility of transnational corporations in respect of human rights. The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
drawn up in 1976 and revised in 2000, emphasizes the duty of enterprises to respect the 
human  rights  of  those  affected  by  their  activities.201 Finally,  the  Norms  on  the 
Responsibilities  of  Transnational  Corporations  and  other  Business  Enterprises  with 
regard to Human Rights,202 adopted by the former UN Sub-Commission on the promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights at its 55th session in 2003, are particularly pertinent since 
it  stipulates  that  companies  ‘‘shall  not  engage  in  nor  benefit  from’’  violations  of 
international humanitarian law.Admittedly, these Norms and Responsibilitiies  have not 
yet been  followed up by the UM Human Rights Council, but there are  ongoing efforts at 
the United Nations to clarify the extent of corporate responsibility for human rights. It  
can therefore be shown that there is a growing consensus that  legal persons in principle 
can be considered to have obligations under international law.
Corporate obligation to make reparation under international law
However,  we  are  now  facing  another  problem  that  virtually  none  of  the  above 
instruments provides for a mechanism for enforcing obligation for non-state entities to 
make reparation; it is the states’ discretion  to choose how to apply the rules.
While it is possible to say that corporations do have a duty under international law to 
make reparation for damage resulting from breaches of their international obligations, it 
is more problematic to assert that this duty is implemented by a mechanism established 
by international  law.  Nonetheless,  a  number  of  recent  international  texts  which  refer 
explicitly  to  the  duty  to  make  reparation  do  seem  to  support  the  claim  that  such 
mechanisms ought to be established.One example is the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 
201 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, para.1. See also Policy Brief: The OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises: A Key Corporate Responsibility Instrument, OECD, September 2003, 
available at  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/38/2958609.pdf.
202 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
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stipulating that ‘‘transnational corporations … shall provide … reparation to those … that 
have been adversely affected by failures [by the corporations] to comply’’ with the norms 
in question.203 
According  to  Basic  Principles  and  Guidelines  on  the  Right  to  a  Remedy  and 
Reparation204, states are obliged to provide victims with ‘‘effective access to justice’’, 
irrespective  of who may ultimately be responsible for the violation,205 and to enforce 
‘‘judgments for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm suffered’’.206 
These entities may include corporations.
Last but not least,  Article 75 of the Rome Statute provides, in a section dealing with 
reparations to victims, that the “court may order reparations” to be paid by individual 
defendants. Accepting such reparations as essentially civil  in nature. According to the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Court may award reparations taking into account 
the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury; awards for reparations must be made 
directly against a convicted person.207 Although such awards for reparations are made in 
the context of criminal proceedings, it follows from the above that they require the same 
elements as an award for compensation in a civil suit. The person against whom an award 
for damages is made must have committed a wrongful act and that act must have given 
rise to the damage. The debate that took place during negotiation of the Rome Statute 
illustrates the delegations’ differing points of view concerning the nature of the duty to 
make reparation. Some delegations perceived reparations as a way for victims to bring a 
civil claim via the Court against the person responsible for the crimes, while others saw 
reparations as an additional sanction pronounced by the Court. The former interpretation 
carried the day, that is, reparations are awarded on an individual basis except where the 
203 Ibid., para. 18
204 A/RES/60/147  (The  Principles  provide  for  mechanisms  that  allow  victims  of  gross  violations  of 
international  human  rights  law  and  serious  violations  of  international  humanitarian  law  to  obtain 
reparation)
205 Ibid., Principles 1 and 3.
206 Ibid., Principles 17
207 Articles 97 and 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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Court deems the award of reparations on a collective basis or a combination of the two to 
be more appropriate.208
Although as imposed by international law this duty to make reparation applies only to 
individuals convicted of a crime, there is nothing to indicate that such a duty could not be 
imposed on a legal person. In fact, a proposal that the Court should have jurisdiction over 
legal  persons was made by France,  but  it  was withdrawn because of the conceptual 
debate as to whether legal persons can incur criminal liability.209 If that proposal had been 
accepted, and if the Court had been given jurisdiction over legal persons, the obligation to 
make reparation  under Article  75 would have applied  to them  ipso facto.  The Rome 
Statute can be considered as expressing the states’  opinio juris in a number of areas210, 
given the large number of signatures and ratifications it has received.
4.2  Imputability of a violation of international humanitarian law to a corporation
A corporation can therefore in principle have obligations under international law. But 
before a corporation can be held liable,  a violation of the law must be attributable to it. 
That is one of three requirement for the establishment of civil liability: a wrong, damage 
and causal relationship between the two.  A violation of international humanitarian law 
which constitutes a wrong can derive from the corporation’s actions or the actions of the 
others. Accordingly, there are two kinds of civil liabilities: liability for its own actions 
211and secondary liability which include vicarious212 and  complicity (aiding and betting) 
liabilities.  Since  US  chemical  corporations  have  been  accused  of  violation  of 
international humanitarian law and the violation in question were actually committed by 
the US government, it is therefore pertinent to see whether the provision of herbicides by 
US chemical corporations falls within the framework  of aiding and abetting liability.
208 P. Lewis and H. Friman, ‘‘Reparations to victims’’, in R. S. Lee, The International Criminal Court, 
Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 2001, p. 483.
209 A. Clapham, ‘‘The question of jurisdiction under criminal law over legal persons: lessons from the  
Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’’, in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi.
210 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, para. 227.
211 When corporation committed a violation of international law
212 See above
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Complicity (aiding and abetting) liability
Complicity is in fact a criminal law concept.   There are  two fundamental elements in 
aiding and abetting concept: the conduct of the person who aids and abets (actus reus) 
and the person's  mental  state  (mens rea).213 As the  actus  reus is  defined ICTY Trial 
Chamber Judgment in Furundzija  as  providing "practical assistance, encouragement, or 
moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."214, this 
element is virtually unquestionable in international criminal law. Controversial here is the 
actus reus element,  whether the aider and abettor need merely have knowledge that her 
actions will facilitate the commission of the crime, or whether she must harbor a purpose 
to facilitate the crime. The  knowledge standard was applied in several post-World War II 
cases. Again in the  Zyklon B  case mentioned above, the prosecutors before the British 
military court: 
did not attempt to prove that the accused acted with the intention of assisting the 
killing of the internees. It was accepted that their purpose was to sell insecticide to 
the SS (for profit, that is a lawful goal pursued by lawful means). The charge as 
accepted by the court was that they knew what the buyer in fact intended to do 
with the product they were supplying.215
In the Einsatzgruppen case, the American military court also used a knowledge test, not a 
purpose test, to convict defendant216. Based on those cases, the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Furundzija adopted a knowledge test: "The mens rea required is the knowledge that these 
acts assist in the commission of the offence."217
US law articulates the types of conducts that constitute a joint and several liability for 
tort. Such liability comes up when a person ‘orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or 
should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own, or 
(b) conducts an activity with the aid of another and is negligent in employing him, or (c) 
213 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, p 191, 236.
214 Ibid, p 235.
215 André Klip et al., Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Intersentia Publisher 2002
216 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen)
217 Supra note 212, p 249.
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permits  the other  to  act  upon his premises  or  with his  instrumentalities.  Knowing or 
having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.’’
With regard to complicity  between companies  and governments,  the theory of ‘‘joint 
action’’ can be applied basing on the joint action test. In Doe v. Unocal Corp, in deciding 
that  Unocal  is  liable  for  grave  breaches  of  human  right  by  Myanmar  military  under 
ATCA218,  the  Court  held  that  that  there  was  an  agreement  between  the  Unocal  and 
Burmese government  with a view to achieving a common design on violating human 
rights.219 However, the appellants challenged not the joint action theory per se but only its 
applicability in this case.
In the second-instance judgment in the case220, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals argued in support of the use of international criminal law standards 
in a civil case in domestic law: (i) international human rights law has been developed 
largely  in  the  context  of  criminal  prosecutions  rather  than  civil  proceedings;  (ii)  the 
distinction between a crime and a tort is of little help in ascertaining the standards of 
international human rights law because what is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort  
in another;  and (iii) the standard for aiding and abetting in international criminal law is 
similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in domestic tort law221
Talisman, a  Canadian  oil  company,   was  sued  for  collaborating  with  the  Sudanese 
government in violations of human rights and war crimes committed in the context of the 
international  armed  conflict  taking  place  in  Sudan222.  Talisman  questioned  the 
employment of the aiding and abetting standard by the Court by arguing that this theory 
did not apply to a civil claim under the ATCA. The Court ruled that this argument was 
unfounded:
218 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), US Federal District Court, judgment of 31 
August 2000.
219 Eric Mongelard, “Corporate civil liability for violations of International humanitarian law, International 
Review of the Red Cross, ”, Volume 88 Number 863 September 2006, p 679.
220 Doe v. Unocal Corp., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judgment of 18 September 2002.
221 Eric, supra note 218, p. 680
222 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 f. Supp. 2d 289, US District Court for the
Southern District of New York, 19 March 2003, p 320.
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Talisman’s contention is incorrect. Its analysis misapprehends the fundamental nature of 
the ATCA. The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for breaches of international 
law. In order to determine whether a cause of action exists under the ATCA, courts must 
look to international law. Thus, whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are 
recognized with respect to charges of genocide, enslavement, war crimes, and the like is a 
question that must be answered by consulting international law223.
The theory of aiding and abetting seems therefore to be applicable in civil  claims for 
violations  of  international  humanitarian  law,  at  least  in  the  United  States  under  the 
ATCA. 
Given the fact is that:
( i) the US herbicide manufactures knew the amount of dioxin contained in the herbicide 
is  much above the level  necessary to  defoliate  food crops,  thus  hazardous to  human 
beings (causing  birth defects, cancer and death ); 
(ii) The  US herbicide manufactures knew the use to which their product would be put in 
Viet Nam and that that the product they supplied to the government would be used for 
military operations in Viet Nam.
Thus, it is theoretically sufficient to conclude that the accused US chemical corporations 
liable for the violation of international humanitarian law during the Vietnam War. It is 
also important to note that ATCA contains no statue of limitation which would bar the 
claims by plaintiff. 
4.3  VAVA v. Dow et al 
Under  the  Alien  Tort  Claims  Act  (ATCA),   United  States  courts  are  granted  with 
jurisdiction to hear civil actions for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or 
United States treaty law. In  Falartiga v. Pena-Irala224 (1980) concerning an action of 
torture by a Paraguayan police officer against a Paraguayan national,  this provision is 
interpreted by the Court that the US federal courts have jurisdiction to hear any civil case 
based on a violation of international law, no matter of where the violation took place. 
Furthermore,  restrictions  upon  Falartiga doctrine  have  also  been  manifested.  For 
example in  Siderman v. Argetina,  it  has been held that ATCA does not constitute  an 
223 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 374 f. Supp. 2d 331, US District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, 13 June 2005.
224 Falartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630, F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980)
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exception to the principle of sovereign immunity so that  the US government can not be a 
defendants in any case.
On  January  30,  2004  Vietnam Association  for  the  Victims  of  Agent  Orange/Dioxin 
(VAVA) and several individuals who were ill or had suffered illnesses due to exposure to 
agent  orange filed  a  lawsuit  against  37  chemical  manufacturers  who produced  agent 
orange for the US government for use in Vietnam, inlucding Dow, Monsanto, Hercules, 
Diamond Shamrock. The primary claim was that the use of agent orange violated the 
Hague Regulations of 1907 which prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons in 
war.
The case was assigned to Judge Jack Weinstein. Judge Weinstein was the judge who had 
heard cases filed by the United States veterans of the war in the early 1980's who had 
sued for damages due to their own injuries as a result of their exposure to agent orange. A 
multi-district litigation order required all cases involving Agent Orange be assigned to 
Judge Weinstein.
The original US veteran’s cases were settled in the late 1980's with out-of-court payment 
of USD 180 million made to US veterans. In the mid 1990's another group of US veterans 
sued again and their case was still pending at the time the case for the Vietnamese was 
filed in 2004. Thereafter the cases of the US veterans and the Vietnamese victims were 
virtually consolidated. That is, the motions to dismiss the cases filed by the defendants 
were heard on the same day.  The decision of Judge Weinstein to dismiss both cases 
occurred at about the same time. The appeals of the cases were heard on the same day 
and the decisions affirming the dismissals were issued on the same day, February 22, 
2008.
Both Judge Weinstein and the Court of Appeals rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs 
that agent orange which was laced with dioxin was a poisoned weapon which violated the 
Hague Regulations. Both decisions held that these agents were mere herbicides which 
were aimed a plants not people, and no rule of international law in existence during the 
war prohibited the use of herbicides. By refusing to recognize that the presence of dioxin 
fundamentally shifted these chemicals from anti-plant agents to poisonous weapons, both 
Judge  Weinstein  and  the  court  of  appeals  were  able  to  justify  ruling  against  the 
Vietnamese  victims.  Also,  after  the  case  had  been  filed  the  US Supreme  Court  had 
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decided a case called Sosa v Alvarez-Machain. In Alvarez-Machain 225, in its first opinion 
on this law,  the Supreme Court held that it conferred jurisdiction on the district courts for 
violation  of  international  law,  but  specified  that  such  jurisdiction  was  limited  to 
violations  of  international  law norms that  did not  have less definite  content  than the 
paradigm familiar  when  the  law was  passed  in  1789.  This  would  appear  to  include 
serious violations of international humanitarian law such as torture, genocide,  slavery, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other acts of a similar level of “badness”.  By 
doing so the Court more narrowly interpreted the Alien Tort Statute. Both courts used the 
opinion in Sosa to support their rulings that the use of these weapons did not violate any 
treaty or universally recognized customary international law.
The  case  of  the  US  veterans  was  also  dismissed  on  the  grounds  that  the  chemical 
companies  were  protected  from  suit  under  the  government  contractor  defense.  This 
defense extends the shield of immunity which the state has under "sovereign immunity" 
to contractors who provide products to the government as long as they disclose to the 
government information about the dangers of the product. The US veterans claimed the 
chemical companies did not disclose what they knew about the dangers of dioxin to the 
government. The Vietnamese plaintiffs relied on the arguments made by the US veterans 
to support their domestic law claims so that the loss in front of Judge Weinstein and the 
court of appeals by the US veterans applied to the Vietnamese plaintiffs as well
225 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al., 542 US Supreme Court, 29 June 2004
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion
The war in Vietnam ended  exactly over thirty five years ago, but its consequences is still 
being felt today and will continue for years to come. For those who were affected by 
Agent Orange, the effects are seen not only in themselves, in the deadly diseases they 
have to carry and fight against, but also in their children and their children’s children. No 
one knows when this is going to end. Ironically though, while those who sprayed or took 
part  in  the  spraying  of  Agent  Orange  have  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  and 
assistance, particularly financial, the victims of Agent Orange, those Vietnamese veterans 
and civilians who were directly sprayed on or affected by it are not even recognized as 
having  been  affected.  This  paper  has  sought  to  clarify  the  responsibilities  under 
international humanitarian law of the United States, its agents and the corporations that 
provided the toxic herbicides,  and has also explored the legal difficulties in obtaining 
redress for the harm done. It is an attempt to draw more attention to the plight of the 
Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange. It has examined the legality of the use of Agent 
Orange  and  other  herbicide  in  Vietnam.  The  present  report  concludes  that  military 
herbicide use in Vietnam was a breach of international law of armed conflicts. It is a 
violation of customary prohibition of chemical warfare as expressed in the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol,  of  the  Hague  proscription  of  the  use  of  poison  and  weapons  that  cause 
unnecessary  suffering,  as  well  as  of  the  customary  principles  of  distinction  and 
proportionality. This finding is extremely important as it demonstrate that decisions by 
Judge Weinstein and the Court of Appeals that these agents were mere herbicides which 
were aimed a plants not people, and no rule of international law in existence during the 
war prohibited the use of herbicides and that the use of these weapons did not violate any 
treaty or universally recognized customary international law is something unpersuasive. 
Thus, those who caused the sufferings for the through their illegal acts should have the 
responsibility to help ease such misery. Sadly, the failure to acknowledge such finding 
thirty five years after the end of the Vietnam war will only prolong suffering and misery 
for the Vietnamese victims. 
By violating  international  law of  armed  conflict,  the  US government  is  under   legal 
responsibility to prosecute those committed and involved the crimes and compensate for 
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the victims and that US chemical corporations which provided herbicide for US military 
use  in  the  Vietnam  war  could  be  held  accountable  for  aiding  and  abetting.  Legal 
responsibility do exist but so difficult to enforce for the case in study given the nature of 
world politics and the current state of international law.  
It  is  the only hope that  the call  of  conscience  will  urge the US Government  to  take 
necessary steps to help alleviate the suffering of the Vietnamese victims, which in turn 
contributes  to  the  closing  of  a  traumatic  history  and  striving  toward  a  better  future 
between the two countries.
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